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INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself for a moment as a mother seeking help from the state.
Your need might be for education, safety, housing, money, health care, or
childcare. Depending on where you live, your race, your gender, your class
position, and the composition of your family, the support you seek is likely to
arrive, if it arrives at all, in radically different packages. If you are
economically privileged and, more likely than in a world without structural
racism, white, help is likely to come in to you in a particular form. For you,
help may come in the form of high quality public schools, childcare, home
mortgage deductions, safe streets, or employer-based but government-
subsidized health care. The support you receive from that subject position is
certainly not enough to meet your needs, but it is not likely to be structured to
penalize you for seeking support. The only real risk you run by seeking support
is the possibility that you might not get it.
In contrast, if you are poor and, more likely than in a world without
structural racism, African American, and if you are living as a parent in the
inner city, any support you receive is likely to be structured quite differently.
The meager support that may be available comes in the form of welfare; food
stamps; public housing; underfunded, overpoliced schools; and publicly
funded, overcrowded health care facilities. Moreover-and central to the
arguments put forward here-this support is likely to come at an enormous
punitive risk both within the initial social welfare system and beyond. The
regulatory mechanisms of these systems of support are likely to function in at
least two ways. They will, if you are lucky and resourceful enough to navigate
the many barriers to receipt, dole out some much-needed but meager support.
But the price of that support is exposure to a set of mechanisms, here termed
"regulatory intersectionality," by which regulatory systems intersect to share
information and heighten the adverse consequences of what those systems quite
easily deem to be unlawful or noncompliant conduct. Quite simply if you are
poor, African American, and living in the inner city, by seeking support you
risk far more than simply being deprived of support. By seeking support you
elevate your risk of exposure to ever more punitive consequences. You risk
exposure, in the examples in this Article, to a child welfare system that is far
more likely to take and keep your children and in which your children are likely
to fare horribly. You also risk exposure to a criminal "justice" system that is
more likely to impose harsh criminal consequences for your allegedly deviant
conduct. The state you encounter not only fails to respond to your needs in any
meaningful way, but is instead hyperregulatory, meaning here that its
mechanisms are targeted by race, class, gender, and place to exert punitive
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social control over poor, African-American women, their families, and their
communities.
Feminist political and legal theorists are currently engaged in a vital
project. This work, led by scholars like Martha Fineman and Maxine Eichner,
teaches that both dominant American political theory and, more importantly,
the structures of current state institutions fail to enable families to meet
dependency needs and are, in the name of an emaciated view of autonomy,
obscenely content to leave gross inequality in place. This work provides a
potent critique, a clearly better vision of the state we need, and a theory that
holds great promise in getting us there. As we consider their vision, however,
we must remember-as the work of Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Khiara Bridges,
Kaaryn Gustafson, and Dorothy Roberts, among many others, counsels-that if
we are to build institutions that are responsive to some of the most vulnerable
among us, we must seek to understand the particular institutional realities that
constitute the relationship between poor and disproportionately African-
American women and the current state, and we must ask how these particular
realities impact the path to a supportive or responsive state.
This Article builds on the work of critical race theory, intersectionality
theory, and critical sociology to make three interrelated arguments. First, the
Article argues that social welfare institutions that serve and target poor
communities are characterized by phenomena here termed "regulatory
intersectionality," defined as the means by which regulatory systems intersect
to share information and heighten the adverse consequences of unlawful or
noncompliant conduct originally observed in a social welfare setting. Second,
in addition to introducing and exploring the specific functioning of regulatory
intersectionality, the Article borrows from the work of Loic Wacquant to
introduce a second broader set of terms: "hyperregulation" and the
"hyperregulatory state." While regulatory intersectionality describes the
1. Feminist theory has long been criticized for centering the experiences of white, citizen, middle-
class women and eliding the experiences of women who differ along the lines of race, citizenship, class,
or other identity axes. Historically, by centering the experiences of white women of privilege, streams
within feminist discourse have given rise to social policy that at best fails to meet the needs of poor
women and women of color and at worst contributes to their continued subordination. The critique
raised by Kimberl6 Crenshaw in 1991 that the domestic violence and anti-rape movements, by centering
the experiences of white citizen women, at best erased and at worst undermined the safety and needs of
women of color is among the most trenchant of such critiques. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping The
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241 (1991). For foundational pieces on this topic, see, for example, bell hooks, AIN'T I A WOMAN:
BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE, ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT
SOME OF Us ARE BRAVE: BLACK WOMEN'S STUDIES (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982); THIS BRIDGE
CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldi~a
eds., 2d ed. 1983). For relevant readings specific to some of the social welfare policy that is discussed in
Part III of this Article, see, for example, Jill Quadagno, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994). This article does not argue that either Fineman or Eichner
ignore the institutional structures that target poor, disproportionately African-American communities.
The critiques of feminist theory mentioned above do, however, counsel careful attention to these
particular experiences and the particular responses that might lead to a truly supportive state.
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functioning of a particular set of administrative structures, the hyperregulatory
state is broader. It encompasses a wide range of state mechanisms that are
targeted by race, class, gender, and place and that exert social control over poor
African-American women, their families, and their communities. Third and
finally, the Article builds on and responds to theories of vulnerability and the
supportive or responsive state. In this vein it argues that the mechanisms of
regulatory intersectionality render poor African-American women, their
families, and their communities radically more rather than less vulnerable.
Because of this, in order to realize a truly supportive state we must ask difficult
questions about how we might meet the extraordinary needs of those living in
poverty (as well as those who are not living in poverty) in a way that supports
rather than undermines the abilities of families and communities to thrive.
The article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the political
theory referenced above with a particular emphasis on its description of the
functioning of the social welfare state. Part II then contextualizes this political
theory within current discussions of social welfare history, sociology, and
critical race and intersectionality theory and introduces the framework of
hyperregulation and the hyperregulatory state. Part III offers a description of
regulatory intersectionality as it plays out in public health and welfare settings.
Drawing together the formal and informal structures of legal regulatory
institutions and research documenting the disproportionate impact of these
policies on poor women and poor communities of color, this Part highlights
first the exposure of poor pregnant women to child welfare intervention and
criminal prosecution as a result of drug testing in public hospitals; and second
the referral of individuals to child protective agencies when welfare applicants
test positive for drugs or refuse drug tests. In each of these cases, the poor
women seeking support, who are disproportionately African-American, find
themselves subject not only to extraordinary surveillance but to a far-reaching,
interconnected set of civil and criminal regulatory systems designed to impose
escalating punitive consequences for their behavior. Finally Part IV concludes
by offering a very preliminary discussion of the theoretical and practical
implications of regulatory intersectionality and of hyperregulation for building
a supportive state.
I. THE FAILURES OF LIBERAL THEORY AND THE IDEA OF THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE
The recent work of Martha Fineman and Maxine Eichner2 challenges us to
reconceptualize the very subject of law and the role of the state.3 As to the
2. When referencing the work of Fineman I am referring primarily to Fineman's work on
Vulnerability and Dependency: see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY
OF DEPENDENCY (2004) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH]; Martha Albertson Fineman,
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subject, Fineman and Eichner call the fundamental bluff of liberalism. They
remind us that, as much as liberal political theory is built around the
assumption that we are all autonomous and able if simply left alone to realize
our full potential, in lived experience this is very far from true. They remind us
that, while we are sometimes autonomous, we are frequently not. We are
instead dependent and vulnerable. In addition, and crucially, some subjects are
tremendously privileged while others "are caught in systems of disadvantage
that are almost impossible to transcend."4 As to the current operations of the
state in the domestic context, Fineman and Eichner offer a searing indictment.
Each posits that the result of liberal rhetoric is a fundamentally unresponsive
state. Vulnerable and dependent subjects are left alone to succeed or fail and
the profound impacts of privilege and prejudice remain undisturbed. When
people fail to live up to idealized notions of autonomy, they are blamed5 and
either deprived of support or, as Eichner vividly describes in her discussion of
U.S. child welfare policy, severely punished.6
The positive vision of the state that Eichner and Fineman offer is markedly
different and, this article maintains, far better than the current state of affairs.
While Fineman and Eichner differ on crucial issues of policy, the focus of their
critique, and the results they envision,7 they both call for a state that responds
to vulnerability through the creation of policies and institutions that address
The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1
(2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring Equality]; and Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 257 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive
State]. When referencing Eichner, I am referring primarily to MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE
STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT AND AMERICA'S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010). In these texts, Fineman
and Eichner differ both as to the methodology of how one might reach the vision of a supportive (in
Eichner's terms) or responsive (in Fineman's terms) state, and these differences matter a great deal.
They also differ significantly in what the end goal looks like, particularly on issues of how care work
should be compensated. Throughout this section I will highlight, in footnotes, some of these differences.
However, for the purposes of this portion of the article, I highlight the ways in which each author's work
complements and builds upon the other's.
3. Fineman and Eichner's work focuses on U.S. social policy in the domestic context, as do
references to the "state" in this Article.
4. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 2, at 257. Eichner's critique of liberal theory begins not in
current political discourse and its manifestations in social policy but in a fundamental critique of
Rawlsian political theory as exemplified by his work in A THEORY OF JUSTICE. See, e.g., EICHNER,
supra note 2, at 17-26 (critiquing the failure of Rawls to incorporate the role of the family in meeting
dependency needs). In this Article, however, I focus not on Eichner's critique of Rawls per se but on her
analysis of how the idea of autonomy profoundly limits the ability of American political discourse to
justify government institutions that meet dependency needs.
5. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 2, at 257.
6. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 119-23.
7. For discussion, by Eichner, of the differences between her vision of the mechanism of the
supportive state and Fineman's, see id. at 75-77. Eichner identifies crucial differences between her
vision and Fineman's, particularly on the issue of whether parents should be compensated for care work.
In addition, although their work is extraordinarily complementary, they do differ in significant ways in
terms of emphasis. In particular Fineman frames her vulnerability theory around the profound failure of
Equal Protection doctrine to support the conditions for substantive, as opposed to formal, equality.
Eichner's work in THE SUPPORTIVE STATE focuses primarily on how state policies and social
mechanisms can be restructured to support the work of families in meeting dependency needs.
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dependency. Rather than structuring policy in a way that either leaves families
alone to meet needs or punishes them for failing to meet needs, the supportive
state would, in Eichner's terms, "[a]t a minimum . . . arrange institutions in
such a way that family members can, through exercising diligent but not
Herculean efforts, meet the basic physical, mental and emotional needs of
children and other dependents and promote human development while avoiding
impoverishment or immiseration."8
Moreover, Fineman in particular believes that a focus on vulnerability on
the one hand and responsiveness on the other provides a powerful mechanism
to address the profound inequalities that exist in U.S. society. Vulnerability
theory, in Fineman's analysis, forms the basis of a claim that state institutions
must provide not just formal equal access but the material conditions necessary
to achieve substantive equality.9 Fineman and Eichner provide an essential
critique and a compelling vision.
Building on that work, this Article shifts the focus of inquiry to the
punitive mechanisms of the state. It seeks to describe the specific ways that the
mechanisms of the state actually operate for those who are, by virtue of the
intersecting implications of class, race, gender and geography, among the most
vulnerable. The article argues in Part III that in institutions like public hospitals
and welfare offices, poor people, and disproportionately poor people of color,
face a hyperregulatory state. Mechanisms of the state that purport to provide
what remains of a shredded social safety net do not just fail to provide adequate
support or even exact a punitive price for the support within the social welfare
system. Instead, because of their position and their need, poor families face an
extraordinarily punitive state, one whose systems intersect, in a mechanism
referred to here as regulatory intersectionality, to exact escalating punitive
consequences on those who seek its support. Before describing those
mechanisms, however, this Part lays out in more detail Fineman and Eichner's
theory of the liberal subject; the current, largely unresponsive state; and the
responsive state they collectively envision.
A. The Autonomous Subject and the Vulnerable Subject
The theory of the supportive state begins, fundamentally, with a critique of
the American ideal of the person who is governed. Liberal political theory, as
manifested in dominant U.S. political discourse, is built "on its
conceptualization of individuals as autonomous and able."' 0 We are, in this
8. Id. at 78-79.
9. See infra Section I(B).
10. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 17. Fineman makes clear that in her view notions of autonomy
"defined in terms of expectations of self-sufficiency" dominates our political discourse. Fineman,
Responsive State, supra note 2, at 259.
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formulation, people who can pull ourselves up by our proverbial bootstraps.
The purpose of government, then, is to make sure that nothing gets in our way.
We need liberty to protect against incursions on the exercise of our autonomy,
and we need formal equality, some sense not that we will all end up equal but
that we perhaps start the race at the same point, so that we can all reach our
ultimate potential. In popular discourse, this proverbial race is primarily an
economic one. We are all, in theory, free participants in the market, and
nothing is supposed to get in the way of realizing our economic potential.
The problem with these liberal ideas is, in short, that they "[seem] to
mistake this moral ideal for an account of the human condition."" They do so
in two fundamental ways. First, they entirely fail to account for the fact that we
are often dependent. We are young, old, sick, and unable to meet our needs. We
are vulnerable. Second, the theory fails to acknowledge that, "[f]ar from having
equal opportunity, many individuals are caught in systems of disadvantage that
are almost impossible to transcend."' 2 Moreover, these failures are not just
issues of theory. These fallacies are manifest in the state of American law and
policy.
1. The Failure to Account For and Respond to Dependency
The first broad critique of liberal theory is that this political discourse, as
manifested in U.S. social welfare policy, fails almost entirely to account for the
way that families, broadly defined, meet the dependency needs of their
members. Adults in families care for the young and old, and adult members
care for each other in a myriad of ways. And, in a phenomenon termed
"derivative dependency," when family caretakers, who are almost always
women, provide this care work they do so at the expense of their own ability to
be idealized economic actors.13
A few examples make this point evident. In the last several decades we
have experienced radical shifts in the nature of work and family. The
conceptual ideal of the two parent family with one breadwinner barely exists
and in fact never existed as a significant presence in large swaths of
communities of color. Nevertheless it still forms the conceptual basis for many
work-related policies. Today, seventy percent of children live in households
where all parents in the household, be there two or one, work. Despite these
radical shifts in the nature of family and work, the workplace has barely shifted
to accommodate these changes. In fact, as Eichner notes, "a comparison of
policies in 173 countries found that when it came to parental leave protections
in the workplace, the United States came in dead last, tied with only three other
11. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 21.
12. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 2, at 257.
13. FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 2, at 34-37.
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countries: Liberia, Papua New Guinea and Swaziland."l4 In addition to facing a
workplace that is tremendously inflexible, American workers are consistently
called on to work far more hours than workers in other western countries.' 5
Adding to the difficulties created by the lack of flexible workplace policies and
long hours is the absence of high-quality, affordable care. Although children
who receive high-quality care tend to fare quite well, due in large part to the
extraordinarily low compensation offered to those who engage in paid care
work, the vast majority of available childcare is lightly regulated and of low
quality.16
Women who both work and fulfill caregiving roles find themselves lagging
behind on a variety of economic indicators. While women in couples struggle
to maintain economic equality, single women raising children face harsher
circumstances and harder choices. They generally must attempt to balance care
work with employment, but the lower they are on the economic ladder, the
more difficult this balance and the harsher the consequences should their
carefully calibrated work and care plans fall apart. For the poorest women, who
are disproportionately women of color, attempting to provide care for their own
dependent children and family members, all these statistics and policies are
significantly worse. Low-wage workplaces tend to be less flexible and more
precarious than those higher on the economic ladder. The extraordinary
expense of childcare and the lack of any significant effort to subsidize that care
force women into unstable and often unsuitable childcare arrangements and
into a set of arrangements that are nearly guaranteed to fail. And whereas prior
to the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), some women could rely on Aid to Families With Dependent
Children (AFDC) to provide some level of support should they choose or be
forced into unemployment, today the combined impact of work requirements,
time limits, and the extraordinary push in many states to eliminate welfare
makes the choices poor women face all the more difficult. Moreover, as
wealthier women seek to meet the care needs of their families, they employ
poor, disproportionately immigrant women and provide them with generally
low wages and even fewer benefits.
In short, despite the ideal of an autonomous adult actor and a family that is
supposed to provide care work, the reality is that meeting these care obligations
is extraordinarily difficult. It is, for both Fineman and Eichner, our autonomy-
centered political rhetoric that allows the state to fail to intervene to provide
additional support: "[The] assumptions-that individual liberty and equality are
14. EiCHNER, supra note 2, at 27 (citing Jody Heyman et al., The Work, Family and Equity Index:
How Does the United States Measure Up?, INsT. FOR HEALTH & Soc. POL'Y (2007),
http://www.mcgill.calfiles/ihsp/WFEI2007FEB.pdf.




appropriately recognized by law, that dependency is not a condition that law
needs to recognize; that the state should be neutral on issues of family; and that
the state should not adulterate families internal dynamics-prevent policies that
effectively support families."7
2. The Failure to Account for and Respond to Structural Inequality
The second theoretical and practical critique of the way the autonomous
subject drives policy focuses on structural inequality. As Fineman aptly puts it,
in our society "[p]rofound inequalities are tolerated-even justified-by
reference to individual responsibility and the working of an asserted
meritocracy within a free market."' 8 We are a nation characterized by profound
economic inequalities, inequalities that are again more starkly felt in
communities of color.
Although an in-depth discussion of the profound inequities woven into our
current society is well beyond the scope of this Article, a few statistics serve as
a potent reminder of these phenomena. Since the 1970s, the income gap
between those at the bottom and those at the top has continued to widen, with
an ever-smaller share of wealth going to those at the bottom and in the middle
and more going to those at the top. According to the Congressional Research
Service, "U.S. income distribution appears to be among the most unequal of all
major industrialized countries and the United States appears to be among the
nations experiencing the greatest increases in measure of income dispersion."' 9
Looking in particular at African Americans, who are disproportionately
affected by the social welfare policies examined in Part III of this Article,
reveals significant income disparities between African Americans and whites.
For example, sixty-five percent of African Americans studied in the most
recent Pew Charitable Trusts Economic Mobility Project report "were raised at
the bottom of the [family] income ladder compared with only 11 percent of
whites." 20
In addition, although popular rhetoric about autonomy might suggest that it
is quite possible by hard work and effort to move up the economic ladder
17. Id. at 27.
18. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 2, at 251. Fineman's critique is aimed squarely at the
failures of Equal Protection doctrine. In this piece and in a prior piece on vulnerability, Fineman,
Anchoring Equality, supra note 2, Fineman indicts the doctrine for its utter failure to provide any means
to realize substantive equality. This Article draws on Fineman's work on vulnerability, however, not to
engage in the important debates around how that theory might add to Equal Protection analysis but for
its description of the theory and practice of the state as it operates in American society.
19. Linda Levine, The U.S. Income Distribution and Mobility: Trends and International
Comparisons, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. summary (2012), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42400.pdf.
20. Econ. Mobility Project, Pursuing the American Dream: Economic Mobility Across
Generations, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 18 (2012),
www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS-Assets/2012fPursuingAmerican-Dream.pdf [hereinafier,
Pursuing the American Dream].
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during one's lifetime, the Congressional Research Service claims that
"empirical analysis suggests that children born into low-income families have
not become more likely and may have become less likely to surpass their
parents position at the bottom of the income distribution." 21 In fact, according
to recent data, only four percent of those raised in the bottom fifth of household
earnings make it all the way to the top quintile. 22 In contrast, forty-three
percent of Americans raised in the bottom quintile will remain there as adults.23
Blacks are also significantly more likely to be stuck at the bottom of family
income and wealth ladders than whites: "[m]ore than half of black adults raised
at the bottom (53 percent for family income and 50 percent for family wealth)
remain stuck there as adults, but only a third of whites (33 percent for both)
do."24
Despite these and other clear inequalities woven into our society along
lines of gender, class, and race, our social policy does little to nothing to
address these inequalities. Instead, and this is the heart of the critique of what
Fineman terms "the autonomy myth,"25 American social policy is largely
"unresponsive to those who are disadvantaged, blaming individuals for their
situations and ignoring the inequity woven into the systems in which we are all
mired."26
B. Towards a More Responsive State
The social policy and jurisprudence that results from this constricted view
of autonomy justifies and gives rise, in Fineman and Eichner's view, to a non-
responsive state. 27 "[T]he same problematic assumptions that are embodied in
political theory are also present in US law." 28 If, rather than accepting this
constrained view of autonomy and the non-responsive state, the "primary
objective [was instead] ensuring and enhancing a meaningful equality of
opportunity and access, we may see a need for a more active and responsive
21. Levine, supra note 19, at 14.
22. Pursuing the American Dream, supra note 20, at 6.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 20.
25. FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 2.
26. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 2, at 257.
27. By characterizing their collective description of the state as absent and unresponsive, I do not
mean to suggest that either author fails to acknowledge that means by which law and social policy
constitute both the family and the overlapping means by which dependency needs are met or unmet. In
fact, both authors clearly acknowledge the way that law shapes the very nature of the family. See, e.g.,
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 55-57 (2010) ("Just as there is no natural, pre-political family, there are no
natural, pre-political ways in which families function. In today's complex society, the ways in which
families function are always deeply and inextricably intertwined with government policy." (citing
Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 MIcH. J. L. REFORM 835, 836
(1985)). See also FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 2, at 151 ("While the family may be
viewed as private in our rhetoric, it is highly regulated and controlled by the state.").
28. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 27.
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state."29 This envisioned state would not "simply protect citizens' individual
rights from violation by others." 30 Instead, it would "actively support the
expanded list of liberal goods by creating institutions that facilitate caretaking
and human development."3 1 This envisioned state would also move past
constrained notions of formal equality towards a much more robust and
substantive demand on state institutions to create the possibility for real
equality. The "primary objective [would be] ensuring and enhancing a
meaningful equality of opportunity... ."32
The non-responsive state manifests itself in two primary ways: first, in its
failure to regulate the workplace in ways that allow families to balance
employment and caretaking; and second, in the constricted and punitive ways
in which it provides assistance to those in need. The envisioned state would be
restructured to respond in both these areas.
1. The Failure to Regulate the Market and Regulation of the Market in the
Supportive State
The state's failure to regulate the market is a central concern of the theory
of the supportive state. With a few limited exceptions, 33 American law provides
comparatively few restraints on the market designed to support families in
meeting the care needs of their dependents. The supportive state, in contrast,
would "focus on limiting coercion by the market," and would enact policies to
"allow families the institutional space to make important decisions and to
accomplish important tasks without being completely beholden to the
market." 34 For example, upper-hour restrictions on work would be imposed,
time off to meet caretaking needs would be expanded and compensated, and
workers would be allowed flexible work hours if needed to meet caretaking
obligations.35
29. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 2, at 260.
30. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 70.
31. Id. Although Fineman frames it differently, and again focuses more squarely on the failures of
equality doctrine to meet the challenges of structural inequality, Fineman's framing is similar. In her
terms, "[C]onsideration of vulnerability brings societal institutions, in addition to the state and
individual into discussion and under scrutiny. . . . The nature of human vulnerability forms the basis for
a claim that the state must be more responsive to that vulnerability. It fulfills that responsibility
primarily through the establishment and support of societal institutions." Fineman, Responsive State,
supra note 2, at 255-56.
32. Id. at 260.
33. Eichner notes the existence of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as the only federal
legislation specifically designed to address the ability of families to meet caretaking needs. Although
tremendously important for what it does, FMLA is limited in both the employees it covers and the
support it provides. In short the Act guarantees up to 12 weeks of leave for certain caretaking activities
for approximately 50% of the workforce. Because it is unpaid, however, according to at least one
estimate 78% of workers eligible for leave under the Act cannot take advantage of it because the of the
associated loss in wages. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 36.
34. Id. at 64-65.
35. Id.
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2. The Limited and Punitive Nature of the Safety Net and a Newly
Envisioned Set of Supports
Current U.S. social policy provides a severely limited and highly punitive
safety net for those in poverty. In order to receive the meager support offered
by the state, poor women are stigmatized, forced to surrender their autonomy,
and subjected to an extraordinarily punitive system.36 Eichner's devastating
description of the operation of the current child welfare system provides a vivid
example of how current social policy assumes autonomy as a baseline and
stigmatizes and punishes those who fail to meet their own needs. Poor families
receive little to no support in parenting successfully while attempting to survive
the sometimes tremendously difficult conditions of poor communities and the
low wage labor market. The vast majority of interventions are punitive and, for
both the children and the families involved, devastating. As a general matter,
the state only enters when there is an allegation of abuse or neglect. Once the
state intervenes, the vast majority of resources go not to supporting families to
parent successfully, but to moving children into foster care. Once in foster care,
the vast majority of children fare very badly. And, as in the case in so many of
these punitive systems, they focus these punitive resources overwhelmingly on
communities of color. The consequence, as Dorothy Roberts has so thoroughly
and persuasively demonstrated, is a concerted and often devastatingly effective
attack on poor African-American families.37
The supportive state would respond quite differently both for poor women
and for women who are farther up on the economic ladder. In place of the
current child welfare system, the supportive state would be "premised on the
view that children's welfare is a concurrent rather than residual responsibility
of the state, and that this responsibility [would be] best met through supporting
families in the normal course of events." 38 The goal of such a state would be
"supporting the development of flourishing children." 39 The supportive state
then would seek to alleviate child poverty and would provide high quality early
40 4 1education and childcare, sufficient access to low income housing, and
"policies that ensure access to mental health services and drug-treatment
programs."42 More generally, the supportive and responsive state would
provide significantly more access to support for all families in the form of
36. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 2, at 259 ("[T]hose who must resort to certain forms of
state assistance are asked to surrender their autonomy (and privacy) and are stigmatized as dependent
and failures.").
37. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
38. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 123.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 123-124.




universal health care, subsidized childcare, and in some iterations,
compensation for care work.43
II. HYPERREGULATION AND POVERTY
The political theories described above offer a tremendously productive
refraining of the liberal subject and the role of the state and a strong vision of
what the supportive or responsive state might entail. The idea of placing
vulnerability, as opposed to constrained notions of autonomy, at the center of
liberal theory creates a shift in the burden placed on the state. As Fineman
frames it, "[t]he nature of human vulnerability forms the basis for a claim that
the state must be more responsive to that vulnerability."" These theorists also
clearly understand and acknowledge that poor women, and, disproportionately,
communities of color, are stigmatized and punished in the current social
welfare system. Their revision of the subject, privacy, and dependency, if
adopted, would likely result in some movement towards eschewing the stigma
currently associated with seeking support.
My concern is not that these theorists fail to pay attention to how poor
women are treated. In fact to varying degrees these realities are in fact
described in their work. Instead, I want to argue as a next step for a heightened
focus on the specificity of the mechanisms of support as they currently operate
in low-income communities. This focus is crucial because it seems very
possible, given the repeated marginalization of poor women of color within
some of feminist theory,45 that unless these issues are foregrounded, the appeal
of the narrative of the state as it operates for those not in poverty could easily
dominate the development of this work. This possibility would leave
uninterrogated and untouched those wide swaths of policy that uniquely and
disproportionately impact poor communities in general and poor communities
of color specifically. In this scenario, the important task of realizing a more
supportive state could easily focus on creating legal structures to facilitate
caretaking for some at the expense of interrogating and dismantling the
punitive and hyperregulatory mechanisms of the those parts of the state
targeted at poor women generally and poor women and communities of color
specifically. 46
43. Eichner and Fineman diverge to a certain extent on this issue. Fineman suggests in THE
AUTONOMY MYTH that care work should be publicly compensated. FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH,
supra note 2, at 285-87. Eichner rejects this proposal. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 76-77. It is important to
note that Eichner and Fineman also both devote substantial parts of their analysis to the crucial questions
of how the supportive state should support women's equality. For example, Eichner suggests policies
that would encourage both men and women to provide care work. Id. at 82-83.
44. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 2, at 255-56.
45. See supra note I and accompanying text.
46. One example of this phenomenon in popular discourse was clear from the extraordinary focus
among professional women on the publication of Anne-Marie Slaughter's Why Women Still Can't Have
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A variety of sources from critical race theory, history, and sociology
provide a rich context for understanding the mechanisms of the state as they
function specifically in poor communities. In particular, some specifics from
the history of social welfare policy in the United States explain the bifurcation
of support systems in U.S. social policy, which has split our safety net into one
for those in poverty and another for everyone else. In addition, recent
discussions within both sociology and law about the status of privacy rights in
poor communities and the means by which legal and social welfare systems,
both civil and criminal, intersect to control poor communities of color provide
an essential framework.
A. A Bit of Social Welfare History
As has been well told elsewhere, at the advent of the New Deal the United
States made a crucial set of decisions about how to structure its welfare state.
Very roughly speaking, the set of supports created in the 1930s and then
significantly expanded and reconfigured during 1960s and the Great Society
were split in two.47 One set of supports was created for a group viewed as
workers and therefore deserving of support. These programs, like Social
Security and Medicare, did not have income cutoffs. Although of course certain
categories of workers were originally excluded,48 this category of social
supports was created and remained in place for those who, politically speaking,
paid into the system.49
During the same period (starting during the New Deal and continuing
through the 1960s) another very different set of supports were created for some
in poverty: those deemed worthy of support but still poor and in need not just
of support but, so the dominant political consensus dictated, of behavioral
control. 50 Originally Aid to Dependent Children (later renamed Aid to Families
with Dependent Children) was created primarily to enable poor white widows
to remain in their homes and care for their children. This program was, like
poverty programs that preceded it, focused strongly on controlling the behavior
It All, THE ATLANTIC, July/August 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-
women-still-cant-have-it-all/309020. For some coverage on the response to the article, see the links
embedded in Anne-Marie Slaughter, The "Having it All" Debate Convinced Me To Stop Saying
"Having it All, " THE ATLANTIC.COM (July 2,2012, 9:11 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/the-having-it-all-debate-convinced-me-to-stop-
saying-having-it-all/259284/).
47. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A HISTORY OF WELFARE IN
AMERICA 236-39 (1986).
48. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE 1890- 1935 5 (1994).
49. Dorothy Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income Mothers' Decisions
About Work At Home and in the Marketplace, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1029, 1032 (2004).
50. For a discussion of the historical origins of this split in U.S. social welfare policy and their
relationship to who was "deserving," see KATZ, supra note 47, at 238-39.
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of its recipients. Later, during the War on Poverty and the Great Society,
programs like Food Stamps and Medicaid were added to those programs
exclusively for those in or near poverty. The poverty programs have been, since
their very inception, focused on scrutinizing and controlling the behavior of
recipients. Moreover, as AFDC was transformed in the 1960s as the result of
extensive activism and litigation, from a program primarily for poor white
widows to a program open to poor communities of color, the nature of extent of
behavioral controls became inextricably linked to structures of racial
subordination.51
B. Privacy Deprivation and Criminalization as the Price of Support
Social and behavioral control in American poverty programs is often
accomplished through privacy incursions almost unimaginable in the regulatory
framework of support programs provided to those of means. Although one
could scarcely imagine policies like this as a condition of receipt of benefits
such as the child care or home mortgage tax deductions, poverty programs
regularly invade both the homes (and more recently the bodies) 52 of poor
people as a condition of support. The jurisprudential approval of these practices
began in the Supreme Court's decision in Wyman v. James. 53 At issue in that
case was a New York State requirement that welfare recipients consent to a
home inspection as a condition of eligibility. The plaintiffs argued that while
the State was clearly entitled to gather all information relevant to establishing
Ms. James's eligibility for AFDC, it could not abrogate her Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches of her home as a condition of her eligibility
for AFDC. Despite the fact that an applicant or recipient who, by definition, has
no other means of support must consent to the search or lose that support, the
Court held that the requirement did not violate the Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.54 In dissent Justice Douglas
states clearly the class distinction at the heart of the majority opinion:
If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent,
affluent cotton or wheat farmer receiving benefit payment for not
growing crops, would not the approach be different? Welfare in aid of
dependent children . . . has an aura of suspicion. There doubtless are
frauds in every sector of public welfare whether the recipient be a
51. See generally QUADAGNO, supra note 1. For commentary on the activism of African-American
women in the Welfare Rights movement during this period that includes extensive discussions of the
relationship between the Welfare Rights and Civil Rights movements, see FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE
BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA (2007).
52. See infra notes 196-206 and accompanying text.
53. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
54. Id. at 317.
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Barbara James or someone who is prominent or influential. But
constitutional rights - here the privacy of the home - are obviously not
dependent on the poverty or on the affluence of the beneficiary; and
their privacy is as important to the lowly as to the mighty.55
Justice Douglas's views, however, did not hold sway. In fact, in recent
years, scholars have carefully detailed the way that poverty-focused social
welfare programs increasingly offer proof both that poor people hold no
genuine right to privacy once they seek support and that, more and more
frequently, poverty-focused social welfare programs employ the methods and
modalities of the criminal justice system. These two related conclusions are
strongly articulated in the work of Khiara Bridges and Kaaryn Gustafson.
Khiara Bridges's work on New York State's Prenatal Care Assistance
Program (PCAP) program provides strong support for her thesis that the
suggestion that poor women exchange their privacy rights for support
significantly understates the problem. 56 Bridges centers her analysis around the
extraordinary amount of information collected from low-income women as a
price of PCAP. In that program, as Bridges extensively documents, poor
women seeking prenatal care are forced to provide extensive information to a
wide variety of professionals (nurses, social workers, and the like) about
subjects ranging from her diet, her income, her history with child welfare
agencies, her immigration status, her mental health history, her relationship
history, any history of violence, her use of contraception and her parenting
plans, all well before she accesses this support. As is the case in the examples
in Part III of this article, in the PCAP setting, the effect is that "poor women's
private lives are made available for state surveillance and punitive state
responses and they are exposed to the possibility of punitive state responses."58
Bridges concludes that rather than bartering their privacy for benefits, it is more
accurate to state that, in our current socio-political and legal environment, poor
families have no privacy rights to begin with. 5
Kaaryn Gustafson's work on the criminalization of welfare adds another
crucial piece to the framework for understanding the current administrative
modalities of poverty programs. Gustafson demonstrates in extraordinary detail
that, today, "[w]elfare rules assume the criminality of the poor . . . [and] the
logics of crime control now reign supreme over efforts to reduce poverty or to
ameliorate its effects."6 0 Gustafson provides ample evidence for these claims.
55. Id. at 332-33.
56. Khiara Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 24 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 114 (2011).
57. Id. at 124-133.
58. Id. at 131.
59. Id. at 173.
60. KAARYN GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION
OF POVERTY 1 (2011).
332 [Vol. 25:2
The Hyperregulatory State
The expanding reach of the criminal justice system is manifested in social
welfare programs in at least two ways: first, in the use of the mechanisms and
modalities of the criminal system within the benefit application process; and
second, in the increasing use of the welfare system as an extension of law
enforcement. Leading the trend toward rendering the welfare system analogous
to the criminal justice system is the use of biometric imaging technology. In
response to a series of federal studies revealing some instances of receipt of
benefits in more than one jurisdiction by individuals, the 1996 welfare reform
law "required states to institute fraud prevention programs." 61 Several states
instituted a program of biometric imaging in which, in most cases, applicants'
fingerprints and possibly photographs are scanned and then run through a
variety of state databases, purportedly to detect instances in which recipients
are attempting to "double dip" by receiving benefits in more than one
jurisdiction.62 Even before these systems were in place, instances of welfare
fraud in the form of double dipping were characterized more by infamous
individual instances rather than by any data showing a widespread practice.
Today, given the extensive system of data cross-checking now in place, these
processes are even more unlikely to and in fact do not actually uncover
significant instances of welfare fraud. But, as Gustafson observes, biometric
imaging "serves another purpose: the collection of biometric data scrutinizes
and stigmatizes low-income adults in a way that equates poverty with
criminality."6 In these states, because of the extensive interviewing, data
checks, and finger imaging, "applying for welfare mirrors the experience of
being booked for a crime." 65
In a related trend, it is quite clear that, post 1996, the welfare system has
been employed as yet another tool in criminal law enforcement. This is
manifested in several ways. First, post-1996, law enforcement officials need
merely ask for public benefit records in order to receive them. Absolutely no
66
legal process is required. This allows law enforcement agencies to use the
extensive personal information held within these databases for investigation
and prosecution of crimes. Beyond this, there have been several instances in
61. Id.at 56.
62. Id. at 56-57.
63. For example, in California, the state identifies only three matches per month and refers only one
of these cases per month for more extensive fraud investigation. Id. at 57. Although policymakers claim
that the purpose of these programs is to as much to deter as to detect fraud, there is also extensive
evidence that it deters not fraud but applications of needy individuals. Id. at 57-58. Policymakers
continue to persist in requiring finger imaging despite extraordinary evidence of its high cost and low
utility in detecting fraud. For example, according to a report evaluating its effectiveness in Texas, it
failed to reduce caseloads, cost the taxpayers $15.9 million between its implementation in 1996 and
2000, and, over the same period, "resulted in only nine charges filed by the DA, 10 administrative
penalty cases, and 12 determinations of no fraud." Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 57.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 54 (citing 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(8) (2006) and 42 U.S.C. 1437z (2006)).
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which welfare agencies have collaborated with law enforcement to apprehend
individuals for reasons utterly unrelated to their public benefits. For example,
67under a program called Operation Talon, Food Stamps offices collaborate
with law enforcement to apprehend individuals with outstanding warrants.
After a computerized match is run between the relevant databases, individuals
receive a pretextual letter asking them to come in to discuss an issue
concerning their benefits. When they arrive, they are met by law enforcement
68and arrested. Between 1996 and September 20, 2009, 14,645 individuals were
arrested under this program. 69
This article will argue, in Part IV, that remembering the fundamental
structural divide in U.S. social welfare policy, the wholesale lack of privacy
rights, and the remarkable criminalization of support-along with the
inextricable ties to racial subordination embedded in all these trends-is crucial
to conceptualizing a path to the supportive state.
C. From Less Eligibility to Hyperregulation
In 1971, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward published Regulating the
Poor, a groundbreaking treatise that would shift the way that left scholars
talked about U.S. poverty policy. Piven and Cloward argued that "relief
programs are initiated to deal with dislocations in the work system that lead to
mass disorder, and are then retained . . . to enforce work.',70 Highlighting
current manifestations of the age-old social welfare theory of "less
eligibility,"" Piven and Cloward persuasively chronicled the systematic
expansion and contraction of public aid as a mechanism to keep workers
vulnerable and beholden to the vagaries of the low wage labor market. Loic
Wacquant has recently and persuasively argued, however, that it is no longer
sufficient to analyze the operation of the social welfare state in isolation.
Instead, Wacquant and others urge us to widen the frame and see how both
67. In 2008, the Food Stamp Program was renamed and is now called Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program or SNAP. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246,
§4001(b), 122 Stat. 1651 (2008). Nevertheless for the purposes of name recognition this article continues
to use the better-known term "Food Stamps."
68. GUSTAFSON, supra note 60, at 54.
69. Hearing to Review Quality Control Systems in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
Before the H. Subcomm on Dep't Operations, Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry of the H. Comm. on
Agric., Illth Cong. 28 (2010) (statement of the Hon. Phyllis K. Fong, Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of
Agric.). For more information on Operation Talon, see GUSTAFSON, supra note 60, at 54.
70. FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF
PUBLIC WELFARE xvii (updated ed. 1993) (1971).
71. "Less eligibility" describes the principle, long established within social welfare policy, that any
means of support offered to the poor should leave them in circumstances worse than those they would




social welfare and criminal justice mechanisms interweave to control poor
communities. As Wacquant frames it,
[T]his cyclical dynamic of expansion and contraction of public aid has
been superseded by a new division of the labor of nomination and
domination of dependent populations that couples welfare services and
criminal justice administration under the aegis of the same behaviorist
and punitive philosophy. The activation of disciplinary programs
applied to the unemployed, the indigent, single mothers, and others
"on assistance" so as to push them onto the peripheral sectors of the
employment market, on the one side, and the deployment of an
extended police and penal net . . . on the other side, are the two
components of a single apparatus for the management of poverty that
aims at effecting the authoritarian rectification of the behaviors of
populations recalcitrant to the emerging economic and symbolic
order.72
Wacquant thus insists that the U.S. social welfare state operates as one of
two interlocked systems that work together to discipline those who threaten the
neoliberal economic order.73 In his terms, "workfare" and "prisonfare" are
inextricably linked.74 And those disciplined are, of course, raced black, both
actually and as a matter of symbolic ordering.75
Frank Rudy Cooper recently noted that Wacquant also offers valuable
terminology for describing the targeted nature of these interlocking systems.
Cooper, citing Wacquant, recently argued that we should use the prefix "hyper"
as opposed the descriptor "mass" to describe the phenomena of incarceration in
poor, urban communities of color in the United States. Cooper notes that the
use of the prefix "hyper"
72. LoTC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY 14 (2009).
73. Wacquant genders the two systems (penal and social welfare) female and male respectively. Id.
at 14-15. Although this article does not focus on the question of the gender of the penal arm as
Wacquant describes it, the gendering of the penal system as male is problematic in its elision of one of
the fastest growing incarcerated populations, poor women of color. For a broad ranging discussion of the
implications of this trend, see the symposium issue recently published by the UCLA Law Review
entitled Overpoliced and Underprotected: Women, Race and Criminalization, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418
(2012). As described by Kimberl6 Crenshaw, whose article introduces the volume, "More than simply
adding women of color into the mix, this symposium interrogates the terms by which women are
situated both within the discourse of mass incarceration as well as within various systems that overlap
and that contribute to the vulnerability of racially marginalized women." Kimberl6 Crenshaw, From
Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race and Social
Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1422 (2012).
74. WACQUANT, supra note 72, at 79.
75. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN AN AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (showing that the criminal justice system and its associated civil feeder and
postincarceration classifications systems serve to strip black communities of their freedom and of the
fundamental privileges of citizenship and to recreate, in Alexander's terms, a New Jim Crow).
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is not generalized, but targeted . . . . [H]yper-incarceration should be
seen as a multidimensional attack on a specific group of people.
Wacquant reveals that hyper-incarceration has "been finely targeted,
first by class, second by that disguised brand of ethnicity called race,
and third by place." The class targeted is, of course, the poor. The
races targeted are, of course, blacks and then Latinos/as. The place
targeted is the inner city. 7 6
While Wacquant is referring here to the targeting of penal policies, for the
purposes of this article I use the prefix "hyper" and the term "hyperregulatory
state" to describe a wide ranging set of mechanisms embedded primarily in the
social welfare state that are, like the mechanism Wacquant describes, targeted
by race, class, place (and, I add, gender) to control and subordinate poor
communities in general, and poor communities of color in particular.
In addition to widening the frame and defining terms, we also need to focus
sharply on the details of these "structural and institutional intersections."77 As
Dorothy Roberts's work continually reminds us, describing "particular
systemic intersection[s] . . . help[s] elucidate how state mechanisms of
surveillance and punishment work to penalize the most marginalized women in
our society."78 We must, in short, look at these intersections from the ground
up.
In my review of the work of scholars such as Bridges and Gustafson I have
already described some of the mechanisms that could be categorized as
mechanisms of the hyperregulatory state. The following section turns to one
less-explored piece of this puzzle: outlining the mechanisms of regulatory
intersectionality 79 as it is manifested when poor people seek assistance from
76. Frank Rudy Cooper, Hyper-Incarceration as a Multidimensional Attack: Replying to Angela
Harris Through The Wire, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y. 67, 68-69 (2011) (quoting Loic Wacquant, Racial
Stigma in the Making ofAmerica 's Punitive State, in RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES
57, 59 (2008)).
77. Crenshaw, supra note 73, at 1427. Crenshaw uses the term "structural-dynamic discrimination"
to describe "intersections [that] are constituted by a variety of social forces that situate women of color
within contexts structured by various social hierarchies and that render them disproportionately available
to certain punitive policies and discretionary judgment that dynamically reproduce these hierarchies."
She uses the term "intersectional subordination" to describe "outcomes produced in the interface
between private institutional configurations such as the housing market or neighborhood watches and
the policing power of state actors." Id.
78. Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59
UCLA L. REv. 1474, 1476 (2012).
79. Dorothy Roberts uses the term "system intersectionality" to describe how the policies of the
child welfare and criminal justice system work together to perpetuate the subordination of poor African
American women. Roberts, supra note 78. The focus here is slightly different. While Roberts's analysis
looks at how a variety of policies, such as incarceration for low level drug offenses and the emphasis on
adoption in the Adoption and Safe Families Act work together to lead to African-American women
losing their children, the analysis here looks at a particular kind of intersections whereby information
travels from one regulatory system to another, resulting in heightened consequences for the person
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some of the most basic social support mechanisms that exist in the United
States: public health and welfare. In each example, information that is deemed
to indicate non-compliant and/or deviant conduct travels from the original
social welfare system into other even more punitive systems. It is in large part
through the mechanisms of these processes that the systems work together to
impose ever-heightening penalties on the families that seek assistance.so
To understand the impact of regulatory intersectionality (and the broader
concept of the hyperregulatory state) on the theory and path to realization of a
more responsive or supportive state, it is important to understand both whom
these policies impact and how those impacts shape perceptions of users of the
U.S. social welfare system. In every system described below, be it the social
welfare settings (public health and welfare) or the systems into which data is
transmitted and further punishment imposed (child protection and criminal
justice), these systems disproportionately serve and target poor communities
which are, in turn disproportionately composed of African-American families.
Moreover, as other scholars have amply demonstrated, both the child welfare
and the criminal justice systems contribute to the destruction of poor Black
communities and families and the recreation of a racial caste-like system. This
article takes those arguments to be true. However, it is not necessary, for the
purposes of this article, to re-prove those well-substantiated claims. Here only
two specific pieces of this larger argument are crucial. First, it is important
seeking support. In addition the word regulatory (as opposed to system) calls attention to the focus here
on the myriad of detailed structures that lead to the devastating punitive outcomes described in Part III.
Having said that, however, the terms are clearly closely related.
80. It is important to note that each of these phenomena could be and in some cases has been
studied in more detail than is presented here. For example, Kaaryn S. Gustafson's CHEATING WELFARE:
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY (2011) provides a detailed and extensive
description of how welfare programs are characterized by both assumptions of latent criminality among
recipients and extensive interactions between the welfare and criminal justice systems. John Gilliom's
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001) provides
an astounding look at the mechanisms of surveillance and data sharing that dominate public assistance
programs and fuel welfare fraud prosecutions. Similarly, Dorothy Roberts has for many years been
tracing the means by which poor Black women, through the wielding of racial tropes, the geography of
race and poverty, and the disproportionate targeting of their communities, face interlocked public health,
child welfare and criminal systems that expose them to escalating punishments and reinforce the U.S.
racial hierarchy. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
(2002) [hereinafter ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Roberts, supra note 78; Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy 104
HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991) [hereinafter Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts]. The point of this article is
not to reproduce these descriptions and analysis, but rather to build on them and, more specifically, to
begin to draw attention to the pervasive nature of intersectional regulation across social welfare settings
and beyond.
81. The literature on the topic of race and the criminal justice system is extensive. For a compelling
description of the way that mass incarceration and its concomitant over-policing, targeted prosecution,
and post-conviction civil consequences operate to institute a system of racial caste in American society,
see ALEXANDER, supra note 75. For a devastating chronicle of the impact of punitive child welfare
policies on poor African-American children and families, see generally ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS,
supra note 80. For a discussion of the way that child welfare and criminal justice systems work together
to devastate black families, see Roberts, supra note 78.
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simply to understand that the systems at issue affect poor, African-American
communities disproportionately. Second, it is important to understand both the
validity and widespread existence of the perception within poor communities of
the child welfare and criminal justice systems as tools of racial subordination.
These perceptions and realities matter a great deal if we are, as this Article
proposes, to center the experiences of poor African American women in our
analysis of how the state currently operates and how we might theorize a path
from its current operation to a more responsive state. Below is a brief summary
of the data that underlies the claims of disproportionate representation and
disproportionate negative impact.
D. Race, Gender, and Poverty in Social Welfare, Child Welfare, and Criminal
Justice Settings
In both examples described in Part III, clients enter a particular social
welfare setting: public health and welfare. As a result of that entrance, the
original social welfare system comes to the conclusion that the client has
broken some rule of the system or has engaged conduct that system actors or
policies define as deviant or dangerous. In both systems, the conduct leads to
some overt sanction within the social welfare setting: in the example of public
health, an overt deterrence to accessing prenatal care and in the welfare setting,
a denial of benefits. 82 The punishment, however, does not cease with the
imposition of those penalties. The information about that person or that family
then travels from that system to another, resulting in ever-heightening negative
consequences for some or all members of the family. In both systems, the
information flows from the social welfare setting to the child protection agency
and, in some circumstances, to the criminal system. In each of these systems
(social welfare, child protection, and criminal justice), poor African-American
people are disproportionately represented.
Of the two social welfare settings considered below, one serves, by
definition, only those in poverty. Although, under the terms of the federal
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program, states have broad discretion
to design their programs, a central purpose of the program is "to provide
82. In the public health setting, the fact that a pregnant mother tests positive for drugs does not lead
overtly to a sanction within that system. For example, unlike in the welfare context, that mother is not
subject to a rule that would deny her health benefits as a result of that test. Instead, in that setting, the
punishment comes with the transmission of information from the public health system to the child
welfare and criminal systems.
83. In using the term poverty, it is crucial to note that those who fall below the poverty line are
very, very poor. The U.S. poverty measure has been widely criticized as inaccurate and outdated. See




assistance to needy families." 84 In contrast, although the health care facilities
that serve pregnant women are by definition open to all, by virtue of geography
and the race and class stratification of the health care system in the U.S., these
settings serve, disproportionately, poor communities of color.85
Analyzing these systems at their intersections reveals legal mechanisms
that facilitate and, in some cases, mandate the transmission of information
about poor clients from the social welfare setting into other regulatory systems
that are even more intrusive and punitive. In particular, both social welfare
settings are structured to facilitate the transmission of purportedly negative
information about clients from the social welfare setting into the agencies of the
child welfare and criminal justice systems, thereby imposing escalating
punitive consequences on those who seek support. The disproportionate
representation of poor African-Americans in both the child welfare and
criminal justice systems and the means by which these systems work to
perpetuate the subordination of poor African-American communities in the
U.S. have been extensively and compellingly chronicled elsewhere. 86
Nevertheless, because of the way that regulatory intersectionality facilitates this
subordination, it is important to review these arguments here.
As to the child welfare system, Dorothy Roberts's seminal work leaves
little doubt that the child welfare system is "a state-run program that disrupts,
restructures, and polices Black families."87 Her work also leaves little doubt
that "[b]lack families are being systematically demolished"88 by that system. A
few statistics paint this picture clearly. Although the cause of
overrepresentation is disputed, it is beyond dispute that African-American
children are far more likely to be subject to child welfare intervention than
white children 89 and that poor children, who are disproportionately African-
American, are also far more likely to be subject to intervention than children
who are not poor. 90 For example, in 2008, while African-American children
84. 42 U.S.C. §601(a)(1) (2012).
85. See Unequal Outcomes in the United States: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care
Treatment and Access, the Role of Social and Environmental Determinants of Health, and the
Responsibility of the State, CERD WORKING GROUP ON HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, (Jan.
2008), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/CERDhealthEnvironmentReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
86. For a concise description of these phenomena as they impact African American women in
particular, see Geneva Brown, The Intersectionality of Race, Gender and Reentry: Challenges for
African American Women, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY FOR LAW AND POLICY (Nov.
2010), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Brown%20issue%20brief/o20-%201ntersectionality.pdf On the
issue of racial disproportionality in the criminal justice system, see generally ALEXANDER, supra note
75.
87. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 80, at viii.
88. Id. (emphasis omitted).
89. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Addressing Racial Disproportionality in Child Welfare,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 3 tbl. 2 (Jan. 2011),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue-briefs/racial-disproportionality/racial-disproportionality.pdf
[hereinafter Addressing Racial Disproportionalityl.
90. EICHNER,supra note 2, at 120-21.
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were only 14% of the total population, they were 31% of the children in foster
care.91 It is also beyond dispute that African-American children and African-
American families fare far worse than their white counterparts once they come
to the attention of child welfare authorities. As Roberts systematically
chronicles in Shattered Bonds, black children are more likely to be separated
from their parents, spend more time in foster care, and receive inferior
services.92 Although it is difficult to capture the extraordinary presence of child
protection agencies in the lives of poor Black families, the fact at the time
Roberts wrote that "[o]ne out of twenty-two Black children in New York City
[was] in foster care" and one out of ten children in the low income
neighborhoods of Central Harlem was in foster care 9 3 gives some sense of the
incredible depth of this presence and its impact on these communities.
As to the criminal justice system, although many have long documented
the extraordinary negative impact of the War on Drugs and hyper-incarceration
on poor African-American communities, Michelle Alexander's The New Jim
Crow has captured public imagination on this issue as perhaps no other work
has before it. Paralleling Roberts's work on the way that the child welfare
system targets African American communities, Alexander persuasively argues
that the criminal justice system writ large (including the full gamut of systems
from over-policing in poor African-American neighborhoods, through
prosecution and plea bargaining, incarceration, and post-conviction collateral
consequences) "creates and maintains racial hierarchy much as earlier systems
of control did. Like Jim Crow (and slavery), mass incarceration operates as a
tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs, and institutions that
operate collectively to ensure the subordinate status of a group defined largely
by race."94 It is in part through the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality
that the social welfare systems described below feed negative information
about poor women and children out of the already punitive social welfare
setting into these even more harmful and punitive systems.
III. REGULATORY INTERSECTIONALITY
To examine in detail the interactions (or intersections) between social
welfare systems and even more punitive systems, this article focuses on two
specific examples. In the first example pregnant women seeking prenatal care
find themselves and their children subject to often coerced or non-consensual
drug testing and, as a result of that testing, find themselves subject to child
welfare and criminal justice interventions. In the second example, welfare
91. Addressing Racial Disproportionality, supra note 89, at 3 tbl. 2.
92. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 80, at 9.
93. Id.
94. ALEXANDER, supra note 75, at 13.
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applicants are subject to drug testing as a condition of receiving public benefits
and, as the analysis shows, not only risk non-receipt of subsistence level
benefits but are also vulnerable to child welfare and criminal interventions.
These examples are highlighted in detail here because of the relative ease of
tracing the legal and structural mechanisms that facilitate this process. Having
said that, it is clear that the phenomenon of intersecting systems that escalate
punishment in poor communities is broader than these two examples. For
example, public housing residents are subject to extraordinary surveillance,
which can lead not only to eviction but also to criminal prosecution. Similarly,
the close and continuous interactions between schools and the juvenile justice
system that make up the school-to-prison pipeline could also be described and
examined through this lens. Nonetheless, because of the specificity with which
one can trace the intersecting regulatory systems, the two examples provide a
particularly clear sense of the legal and regulatory mechanisms that facilitate
escalating punishment.
A. Seeking Prenatal and Pregnancy Care in Public Health Facilities: Drug
Testing, Child Protection Interventions, and Criminal Prosecutions
Poor women seeking health care during the course of pregnancy face a set
of systems that quite clearly demonstrate the phenomenon of regulatory
intersectionality. The program at the center of the 2001 Supreme Court decision
in Ferguson v. City of Charleston 95 provides an apt example. In Ferguson, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of a drug testing program established by a
task force of police and public hospital employees in Charleston, South
Carolina. Under the program, women who sought prenatal care or gave birth at
a particular state hospital were drug tested without their knowledge or consent
if they met one of nine specified, facially race- and class-neutral criteria.96 If a
woman tested positive for cocaine, she was subject to prosecution for crimes
such as simple possession of a controlled substance, unlawful distribution to a
minor, and endangering the welfare of a child.97 Over the course of its
implementation, the program took on various forms, sometimes offering the
women a chance to avoid prosecution if they enrolled in treatment programs.98
Ten women who received care at the public hospital were subject to drug tests,
and were subsequently prosecuted, challenged the program on the basis that it
95. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). For a related discussion of Ferguson in the
context of class and poverty, see Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Poverty Law, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1427-40 (2012).
96. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71. The nine criteria were: no prenatal care, late prenatal care after 24
weeks' gestation, incomplete prenatal care, abruptio placentae, intrauterine fetal death, preterm labor of
no obvious cause, intrauterine growth retardation of no obvious cause, previously known drug or alcohol
abuse, and unexplained congenital abnormalities. Id.
97. Id. at 72-73.
98. Id. at 72.
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violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the tests
were searches under the Fourth Amendment,99 and that they violated the
"general prohibition against nonconsensual, warrantless, and suspicionless
searches." 00
It may be true that the program at issue in Ferguson was a product of the
much-hyped phenomenon of "crack babies" 01 and was perhaps, in the overt
and targeted nature of the collaboration between the police and hospital, sui
generis. Nevertheless, across the country today, the statutory and regulatory
frameworks that govern confidentiality of health information, child protection
agencies, and criminal justice agencies provide ample opportunities to facilitate
the gathering and transmission of data about drug use by pregnant women out
of the public health setting and into child welfare and criminal systems. Despite
some protections embedded in the laws governing the conduct of health care
providers, significant research indicates that information often does in fact flow
from the public health setting into the child welfare and criminal justice setting
despite the law. These intersecting regulatory systems thus provide a clear
example, in a generic social welfare setting, of regulatory intersectionality.
1. Drug Testing: The Basic Legal Framework
Although drug testing in a variety of contexts is becoming increasingly
commonplace,1 02 when looking particularly at the drug testing of pregnant
women in a health care setting, it is crucial to remember that, except in very
narrow circumstances, information obtained by health professionals in the
course of providing medical care must be kept confidential and can only be
disclosed with the patient's consent.' 0 3 In addition, as noted by the Supreme
Court in Ferguson, "[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the
typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of
those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her
consent."'1 Finally, as the Supreme Court noted in Ferguson, unlike in the
welfare setting or in an employment setting, a pregnant woman seeking health
99. Id. at 76.
100. Id. at 86.
101. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Craig M. Cornish & Donald B. Louria, Mass Drug Testing: The Hidden Long-Term
Costs, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95, 95 (1991) ("Widespread drug testing in the American workplace
began with President Ronald Reagan's enactment of Executive Order 12,564[.]"); Mary Pilon, Drug-
Testing Company Tied to N.C.A.A. Stirs Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at SPI (discussing the
proliferation of drug testing in professional and collegiate sports); Mary Pilon, Middle Schools Add a
Team Rule: Get a Drug Test, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, at Al (discussing middle schools that now test
for drugs).
103. See, e.g., American Medical Association, Patient Confidentiality, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/patient-physician-relationship-topics/patient-
confidentiality.page (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
104. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
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care in a public health setting is not seeking some benefit conditioned on
passing a drug test.'05 The woman is seeking medical care, the quality of which
has always depended on a relationship of trust between doctors and patients. 106
In the context of drug testing pregnant women, these basic rules of law are
complicated by a variety of factors. First, in the vast majority of circumstances,
once a pregnant woman goes to a hospital to give birth and signs a generalized
consent form, health care professionals can legally order virtually any medical
test that they believe to be medically indicated to diagnose and treat the
patient.107 Second, in the context of pregnancy and childbirth, there are valid
medical concerns for the health of both the mother and the fetus during
pregnancy and the child after birth. It is certainly possible that the interests of
the mother and fetus or child may diverge during the course of treatment.
Another complicating factor has to do with laws concerning the reporting of
suspected child abuse. Health professionals are, in the vast majority of
jurisdictions, mandatory reporters. 08 Although child abuse reporting laws vary
significantly by state,' 0 9 it is always true that health care professionals who see
evidence of abuse or neglect have a duty to report that to child protection
agencies. "0 Finally, in every state, child abuse is a crime."'
These final two facts bear repeating and emphasis. In virtually every
jurisdiction, health care professionals are under a duty to report suspected
105. In discussing the constitutionality of the search at issue in Ferguson, the Court distinguished
the Ferguson facts from the four previous settings in which the Court had ruled on the issue of whether a
drug test violated the Fourth Amendment. The four cases involved "drug tests for railway employees
involved in train accidents, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402,
103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), for United States Customs Service employees seeking promotion to certain
sensitive positions, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685
(1989), and for high school students participating in interscholastic sports, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995)... [and] .. . for candidates for designated
state offices. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997)." Ferguson, 532
U.S. at 77. As the Court explained, in those cases, "there was no misunderstanding about the purpose of
the test or the potential use of the test results, and there were protections against the dissemination of the
results to third parties. The use of an adverse test result to disqualify one from eligibility for a particular
benefit, such as a promotion or an opportunity to participate in an extracurricular activity, involves a less
serious intrusion on privacy than the unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties." Id. at
77-78.
106. For a discussion of the effect of mandatory reporting laws, on patient trust see Ellen M.
Weber, Child Welfare Interventions for Drug-Dependent Pregnant Women: Limitation of a Non-Public
Health Response, 75 UMKC L REV. 789, 805 (2006).
107. Elizabeth A. Warner, Robert M. Walker & Peter D. Friedmann, Should Informed Consent be
Required for Laboratory Testing for Drugs of Abuse in Medical Settings?, 115-1 AM. J. MEDtCINE 55
(2003) (footnote omitted) ("Currently, explicit informed consent is not required for clinical drug testing.
In many cases, such as trauma or overdose, explicit consent is not possible. However, even when
substance abuse is suspected and the patient is able to provide consent, clinicians often order drug
testing without the patient's knowledge and consent."). See also infra note 121 and accompanying text.
108. See infra note 224.
109. See infra note 224.
110. See infra note 224.
111. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect,
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws.policies/statutes/define.pdf(last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
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abuse. And in every jurisdiction, people can be prosecuted for various crimes
that constitute child abuse. Given this long-standing, pre-existing legal
background, arguably we need no other law or regulatory scheme in place
either to create a duty to report or for prosecutors to have the authority to
prosecute. In light of this, the remarkable mechanisms put in place to facilitate
reporting and the legal contortions engaged in by prosecutors and some
appellate courts to allow for criminal prosecution'l2 constitute a set of legal
mechanisms to put society's finger on the scale in favor of child protection and
criminal interventions and against the health care and privacy interests of the
women involved. Thus, in this example, the mechanisms of regulatory
intersectionality serve to facilitate the imposition of escalating punishment on
the poor, disproportionately African American women who seek assistance.
This finger on the scale is part and parcel of the hyperregulatory state.
2. Drug Testing ofPregnant Women and Their Children: The Legal
Framework and Hospital Practice
Despite the basic legal framework concerning patient autonomy and
informed consent, a combination of legal rules and medical practices make it
nearly impossible for some pregnant women to both obtain care and avoid drug
testing. Moreover, as discussed extensively below, the discretionary framework
established around drug testing leads to disproportionate punitive impacts on
poor African-American women.113
In two states, Iowall4 and Kentucky,115 health care providers are
authorized by statute to test women and/or infants for exposure to controlled
substances without informed consent. The Iowa provision states:
If a health practitioner discovers in a child physical or behavioral
symptoms of the effects of exposure to cocaine, heroin, amphetamine,
methamphetamine, or other illegal drugs, or combinations or
derivatives thereof, which were not prescribed by a health practitioner,
or if the health practitioner has determined through examination of the
natural mother of the child that the child was exposed in utero, the
health practitioner may perform or cause to be performed a medically
relevant test. . . on the child." 6
112. See infra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
113. See infra Subsection HI(A)(6).
114. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.77 (West 2013).
115. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN § 214.160 (West 2013).
116. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.77 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
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Minnesota and Louisiana go even further, mandating, as opposed to
authorizing, a test on certain newborns. 1 The Minnesota statue provides that:
[a] physician shall administer to each newborn infant born under the
physician's care a toxicology test to determine whether there is
evidence of prenatal exposure to a controlled substance, if the
physician has reason to believe based on a medical assessment of the
mother or the infant, that the mother used a controlled substance for a
nonmedical purpose during the pregnancy.
Although one might assume, from the lack of legislation authorizing
testing without consent in the vast majority of states, that in most circumstances
newborns are not tested without the mother's consent, in practice there is
evidence to suggest that hospitals either routinely test without explicit consent
or use the threat of child protective interventions as a means to pressure women
to consent.1 9 When a pregnant woman goes to a hospital to give birth, she is
generally asked to sign a generalized consent form giving health care providers
authorization to treat both the mother and the eventual newborn child. Although
practices developed in the field of obstetrical care suggest that no test should be
run on a pregnant woman without explicit consent to that test,120 there is
substantial evidence to suggest that hospitals routinely test pregnant women
without their consent. In addition, although the law continues to require
informed consent, protocols for obtaining consent are set at the hospital
level.121 Crucial decisions, including for example whether a general consent to
testing includes drug testing or whether specific consent to drug testing is
required instead, are left to hospitals to determine.122
117. MINN. STAT. ANN §626.5562 (West 2013); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 610(2013).
118. MINN. STAT. ANN §626.5562 (West 2013) (emphasis added). Minnesota law mandates testing
of pregnant women pursuant to similar rules. Pursuant to the same statutory provision, "A physician
shall administer a toxicology test to a pregnant woman under the physician's care or to a woman under
the physician's care within 8 hours after delivery to determine whether there is evidence that she has
ingested a controlled substance, if the woman has obstetrical complications that are a medical indication
of possible use of a controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose." Id.
119. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., West Virginia Perinatal Partnership, Model Informed Consent: Screening and
Testing for Controlled or Addictive Substances in Pregnancy, available at
http://www.wvperinatal.org/downloads/ModelnformedConsentSubstanceScreening080l 1 0.pdf
[hereinafter Model Informed Consent].
121. Krista Drescher-Burke & Amy Price, Identifying, Reporting and Responding to Substance
Exposed Newborns: An Exploratory Study of Policies and Practices, Berkeley, CA: The National
Abandoned Infants Assistance Resource Center (2005),
http://aia.berkeley.edu/medialpdf/rwj-report.pdf; Kathryn Wells, Substance Abuse and Child
Maltreatment, 56 PEDIATRIC CLIN. N. AM 345, 356 (2009) (stating, in a discussion of best practices
protocols for screening newborns who may have been exposed to drugs, that, "[dlepending on a
hospital's policy, consent may need to be obtained prior to testing the mother or infant.").
122. A 2009 guideline issued by the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, Guidelines for Care of
the Known or Suspected Drug (Illicit Substance) Exposed Newborn, provides an example of such a
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Despite legal mandates and best practice suggestions, it appears that both
pregnant women and their newborn children are often tested without notice or
consent. A study funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation as part of the
Substance Abuse Policy Research Program and conducted at the National
Abandoned Infants Assistance Resource Center at Berkeley examined a variety
of laws, policies and practices across eight large urban areas in 2005.123 The
study authors surveyed public and private hospital personnel in each of the
eight cities and interviewed hospital personnel on a variety of topics.124
Hospital staff were asked questions about notification and consent for drug
testing of both mothers and newborns. As to informed consent for the testing of
the mother, 87% of hospital respondents told the researchers that the mother
would be informed about her own test and 83% told them that the mother
would be informed about a test of her child. As to consent, however, the data
were quite different.
[O]f the 34 hospital employees who responded, 41% stated that
consent is not required for mothers to be tested, 41% reported that
specific consent is required, and 18% reported that consent is included
in the hospital's general admission consent. In contrast, a greater
number reported that consent is not required for the newborn to be
tested: 66% of the respondents indicated that consent is not required
for the newborn to be tested; 23% reported that consent is not required
for the newborn if the test is medically necessary, and 11% noted that
the consent to test the newborn is included in the hospital's general
consent. It is important to note that no respondents reported that a
mother's consent is explicitly required to test a newborn.125
Moreover, while some hospitals clearly do discuss drug testing of both
mothers and newborns with their patients, women face substantial risks if they
choose not to consent. For example, internal guidelines issued by the
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in New Hampshire specify that if a
parent refuses drug screening for their infant, the need for the test is
documented in that mother's medical record and "[tihe parent's refusal of drug
screening is reported to the state Child Protective Services . . . as being
policy. Under this guideline, "[p]arental permission is not required for newborn drug screening, but is
recommended. The care agreement signed on admission serves as consent to testing." Dartmouth-
Hitchcock Medical Center, Guidelines for Care of the Known or Suspected Drug (Illicit Substance)
Exposed Newborn (on file with author).
123. Drescher-Burke & Price, supra note 121.
124. The study authors interviewed staff from twenty-nine hospitals across the eight cities studied.
These included ten public and four private for-profit and twelve private non-profit hospitals. They
conducted a total of thirty-nine interviews of hospital staff. Id.at 6. Presumably to preserve the
anonymity of their research subjects, the report does not reveal the names of the urban areas studied.
125. Id. at 9.
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potentially 'neglectful."' 12 6 Hospital practice indicates concurrence with such
policies. For example, in a model form issued by the West Virginia Perinatal
Partners, the pregnant woman, while clearly being given the right to refuse a
drug test for herself, is told,
If you do not agree to testing when it is recommend by your doctor or
midwife, it may result in your baby being tested after birth if the
baby's medical provider has reason to be medically concerned for the
baby's health. If you newborn is tested and the test results are positive
for addictive substances (drugs/alcohol), [Child Protective Services]
will be notified.127
Thus, for all intents and purposes, pregnant women who enter into a
hospital setting at birth and who, for whatever reason, are determined to have
potentially exposed their fetuses to controlled substances, have little means to
avoid drug testing.
3. The Consequences Within the Initial Social Welfare System that
Results from the Drug Testing Information
A variety of researchers agree that the cultural hysteria around drug
addicted newborns, both at the height of the "crack baby" scares in the mid
1980s and today, misconstrue the complex relationship between drug use and
the health of children exposed in utero to controlled substances.128 For
example, as Lynn Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin have noted, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission concluded that "'[t]he negative effects of prenatal cocaine
exposure are significantly less severe than previous believed' and those
negative effects 'do not differ from the effects of prenatal exposure to other
drugs, both legal and illegal. Nevertheless, it is certainly true in some
circumstances that the mother's addiction so dominates her choices that it is
appropriate to remove her child temporarily or permanently from her care. In
addition, where appropriate, respectful, comprehensive and affordable services
are available to support women in facing addiction and in addressing the
poverty-related conditions that make it hard to parent, referring women to
treatment and support services might make a great deal of sense. But what does
126. Guidelines for Care of the Known or Suspected Drug (Illicit Substance) Exposed Newborn,
supra note 122 (alteration in original).
127. Model Informed Consent, supra note 120.
128. See, e.g., Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant Drug-Using Women:
Defying Law, Medicine, and Common Sense, 29 J. OF ADDICTIVE DISEASES 231, 232 (2010).
129. Id. at 233 (quoting Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, U.S.
Sentencing Commission, 21-22 (2002),
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative and PublicAffairs/Congressional Testimony.andReports/Drug-To
pics/200205_RtCCocaine SentencingPolicy/ch3.pdf).
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not make sense, and what is manifest in the systems described below, is a focus
not on genuine support but on the facilitation of punishment that far too often
leads to devastating consequences for both the parent and the child.
There is no question that the possibility that a drug-addicted pregnant
woman will be drug tested and face both intervention by child welfare agencies
and criminal prosecution has significant negative consequences for both the
woman and her child in terms of access to quality health services. 130 First, and
most importantly, punitive policies deter pregnant women from seeking care
both for their addiction and for their pregnancy. As detailed below, South
Carolina has consistently wielded the mechanisms of the child welfare and
criminal justice systems against pregnant women. The impact on pregnant
women's utilization of drug treatment programs is disturbing. In the year
following a decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court to treat a viable
fetus as a "child" for the purposes of South Carolina's child abuse and
endangerment statute,' ' "drug treatment programs in the state experienced as
much as an 80% decline in admission of pregnant women."' 3 2
In addition, as noted by Seema Mohapatra in her article advocating public
health as opposed to criminal responses to drug use during pregnancy,
organizations as wide-ranging and respected as the American Medical
Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Public Health Association
have raised serious concerns that the emphasis on punitive responses to drug
use during pregnancy results in less utilization of vital prenatal care. 133 This is
of particular concern for poor women of color. Women in poverty already face
substantial barriers to accessing comprehensive prenatal care. 3 4 For example,
the Medicaid program, which provides health-care coverage to poor pregnant
women, varies significantly by state in terms of the income guidelines,
130. This is not to suggest that there could not be substantial positive consequences if the mother
and child received appropriate support and care to address the addiction as well as any underlying causes
of the addiction. There is, however, strong evidence to indicate that appropriate services do not exist.
For example, there is a shocking lack of drug treatment programs available to serve pregnant women.
See Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law By Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on Reproductive
Rights, and the War on Women, 32 NYU REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381, 383 (2008).
131. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997).
132. Cynthia Dailard & Elizabeth Nash, State Responses to Substance Abuse among Pregnant
Women, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (2000), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/6/gr030603.html.
133. Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health Approach to Drug Use During
Pregnancy, 26 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 241, 254-55 (2011) (citing Am. Med. Ass'n Bd. of Trustees,
Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 3. AM. MED. ASS'N 2663, 2667 (1990); Comm. on
Substance Abuse, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Drug Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639, 641 (1990); Am.
Pub. Health Ass'n, Illicit Drug Use by Pregnant Women, Policy Statement No. 9020, 8 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 240 (1990); Comm. on Ethics, Am. College of Obstetrics & Gynecology, Committee Opinion
321 Maternal Decision Making, Ethics and the Law, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1127 (2005)).
134. See, e.g., Barbara M. Aved, Mary M Irwin, Lesley S. Cummings & Nancy Findeisen, Barriers
to Prenatal Care for Low-Income Women, 158 W. J. MED. 493 (1993).
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excluding a significant portion of poor pregnant women.135 In addition,
depending on the state, coverage for prenatal care can be limited. For example
many states do not provide coverage for prenatal care until several weeks into a
pregnancy.136 Given the importance of prenatal care to maternal and child
health, creating an additional substantial disincentive to access care has clear
negative impacts on both women and children.
4. Pregnancy and Childbirth at the Intersections: Intervention by Child
Protective Agencies
Despite the emphasis within the health-care profession on patient
confidentiality, state and federal law, as well as widespread practice, facilitate
the transfer of information out of the public health system and into the child
protection and criminal justice systems. On the federal level, the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) provides a significant amount of
funding to state child welfare programs.' 37 In order to participate in the
program and receive federal funds, each state must submit a plan for the
administration of its CAPTA program that complies with a variety of federal
requirements.138 Among other conditions, states must put in place policies and
procedures to address the needs of infants "born with and identified as being
affected by illegal substance abuse . . . including a requirement that health care
providers involved in the delivery or care of such infants notify the child
protective services system of the occurrence of such condition in such
infants."139
State law varies significantly both in how health care providers are to
identify substance abuse and the criteria they are to use in making a
determination about whether to report suspected substance abuse. In addition,
there is some evidence to suggest that, despite variations in state law, in
practice, hospitals usually report women to child protective agencies whenever
a drug test comes back positive.
135. Tara Culp-Ressler & Adam Peck, Without Obamacare, Families Making Under $5,000 Aren't
Poor Enough for Medicaid in Some States, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 15, 2012, 9:30 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2012/08/15/690761/without-obamacare-families-making-under-5000-
arent-poor-enough-for-medicaid-in-some-states/ ("in five states - Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana,
Louisiana, and Texas - a family of three with an annual income over $5,000 makes too much money to
receive any Medicaid assistance.").
136. INST. OF MEDICINE COMM. TO STUDY OUTREACH FOR PRENATAL CARE, PRENATAL CARE:
REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS 59 (Sarah S. Brown ed., 1988).
137. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act State Grants, CHILDREN'S BUREAU,
ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services,
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/resource/capta-state-grants (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
138. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(1) (2010). This requirement was added to CAPTA as a result of the
Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-36, 117 Stat. 800-31 (2003).
139. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2010).
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i. State Statutory Standards for Reporting and Defining Abuse
State laws vary significantly as to when a health-care practitioner can and
must make a report to a child protection agency. These reporting laws tend to
vary along two basic questions: whether a positive test result itself is a
sufficient basis on which to make a report, and whether the report is voluntary
or mandatory. Three states (Missouri,140 Illinois,141 and Kentucky 42) allow but
do not require reporting of a positive test result. Six states (Alaska, 43 Ma 144
Massachusetts,145 Montana,146 Nevada,147 and Pennsylvania 48) require
reporting based upon evidence of something more than just a positive test
report. For example in Alaska, providers must report after making a
determination that the child is in some way "adversely affected by a controlled
substance."I49 In seven states (Arizona, so Iowa, Louisiana,15 Michigan, 53
Minnesota, 154 Oklahoma,155 and South Carolinal 5 6), the report is required based
solely on the positive test. It is important to keep in mind that, as is often the
case with occasional alcohol use during pregnancy, a positive test does not
necessarily mean any harm has occurred.157 Despite this, in the aforementioned
states, any positive test result leads to a report to the child protective agency.
Finally, four states (South Carolina,' Colorado,' 59 Maryland,160 and
Wisconsin 16) legislate not just in the area of when a report should be made, but
also by defining certain acts as abuse per se and allowing for the detention of a
child without a court order. For example, in Colorado, a child can be detained
without a court order "when a newborn child is identified . .. as being affected
by substance abuse."' 62 The South Carolina statute is without question the most
aggressive. That statute creates a presumption, "that a newborn child is an
140. Mo. REV. STAT § 191.737 (West 2013).
141. 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ch.5/7.3b (West 2013).
142. KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 214.160(3) (West 2013).
143. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.17.024(a) (West 2013).
144. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 4011 -B(1) (West 2013).
145. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 §51A(a) (West 2013).
146. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201(3) (West 2013).
147. NEV. REV. STAT ANN. § 432B.220(3) (West 2011).
148. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6386 (West 2013).
149. ALASKA STAT. §47.17.024.
150. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(E) (West 2013).
151. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.77(2) (West 2013).
152. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 610 (2013).
153. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.623a (West 2013).
154. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561(1) (West 2013).
155. OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, §1-2-101(B)(2) (West 2013).
156. S.C. CODE ANN. §63-7-1660(F)(1) (West 2013).
157. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
158. S.C. CODE ANN. §63-7-1660(F)(1) (West 2013).
159. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §19-3-401(3)(b-c) (West 2013).
160. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-818 (West 2013).
161. Wis. STAT. ANN. §48.02(1) (West 2013).
162. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §l9-3-401(3)(c)(1) (West 2013).
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abused or neglected child . . . and that the child cannot be protected from
further harm without being removed from the custody of the mother" if the
infant or mother tests positive for a non-prescribed controlled substance or if
the mother or any child she gave birth to in the past tested positive for a
controlled substance.' 63
ii. Reporting in Practice
Despite the significant variation in state law described above, and the clear
suggestion in several states that reporting requires some evidence of abuse
beyond just a positive test result, in practice, a positive test result alone often
results in a report of abuse to the child welfare agency. The Drescher-Burke
and Price study of policies and procedures concerning substance-exposed
newborns in eight urban centers reveals that "[r]egardless of the state's laws,
most (87%) of the 39 respondents indicated that all identified [substance-
exposed newborns] are reported to [child protective services]. A positive test
alone appears to trigger a report in most cases."'6 This was true across the
eight jurisdictions examined, and despite significant variations in state law.
5. Pregnancy and Childbirth at the Intersections: Intervention by the
Criminal Justice System
The use of the criminal justice system to punish women for exposing their
unborn children to controlled substances is among the most disturbing
examples of the way regulatory intersectionality facilitates escalating
punishment. To date, no state has passed legislation explicitly criminalizing the
transmission of drugs in utero. Despite this lack of explicit legislation,
prosecutors have attempted to contort existing criminal laws to punish drug use
during pregnancy by charging women with crimes such as felony
endangerment, criminal child neglect, delivering drugs to a minor, assault, and
163. S.C. CODE ANN. §63-7-1660(F)(1) (West 2013). In full, the statutory provision states that, "[i]t
is presumed that a newborn child is an abused or neglected child as defined in Section 63-7-20 and that
the child cannot be protected from further harm without being removed from the custody of the mother
upon proof that:
(a) a blood or urine test of the child at birth or a blood or urine test of the mother at birth shows the
presence of any amount of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance unless the
presence of the substance or the metabolite is the result of medical treatment administered to the mother
of the infant or the infant, or
(b) the child has a medical diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome; and
(c) a blood or urine test of another child of the mother or a blood or urine test of the mother at the birth
of another child showed the presence of any amount of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a
controlled substance unless the presence of the substance or the metabolite was the result of medical
treatment administered to the mother of the infant or the infant, or
(d) another child of the mother has the medical diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome." Id.
164. Drescher-Burke & Price, supra note 121, at 9.
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homicide.1 65 In these prosecutions, as a general matter, prosecutors charge
women with crimes against the fetus as a child or person and then seek to prove
that the fetus at issue counts as a child or person as contemplated by the statute.
While these prosecutions have led to punishment through plea negotiations,166
they generally fail when fully litigated. With only two exceptions,167 every
appellate court to consider the issue has overturned these convictions as falling
outside the conduct contemplated by these statutes.168 Despite the lack of
explicit legislation and the spate of negative court decisions, hundreds of
women have been charged with criminal offenses arising from their drug use
during pregnancy.
The most comprehensive study to date on state actions in which "a
woman's pregnancy was a necessary factor leading to attempted and actual
deprivations of the woman's physical liberty" was conducted by Lynn M.
Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin.169 Paltrow and Flavin comprehensively reviewed
413 cases that took place between 1973 and 2005, 354 of which involved
"efforts to deprive pregnant women of their liberty . . . through the use of
existing criminal statutes intended for other purposes."170
165. Mohapatra, supra note 133, at 248-52; Flavin & Paltrow, supra note 128, at 233.
166. For examples of cases resulting in punishment through plea negotiations, see Lynn M. Paltrow
& Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973-
2005: Implications Women's Legal Status and Public Health 39 JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLITCS, POLICY
AND THE LAW, 299,306 (2013).
167. In Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (1997), the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
prosecution of Cornelia Whitner for criminal child neglect. Ms. Whitner's son was born in good health
but tested positive for cocaine at birth. The Court held that the fetus is a viable "person" for the purposes
of the criminal child neglect statute and upheld her conviction. To date this appears to be the only case
that has so held. See also Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748, 1 (2013) (holding that the term "child"
found within Alabama's child endangerment statute includes a fetus).
168. Exparte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748, 17. For cases so holding, see, for example, Cochran v.
Kentucky, 315 S.W.3d 325 (Ky. 2010) (holding that an indictment charging a woman for first-degree
wanton endangerment based on her ingestion of illegal drugs during pregnancy was invalid on its face);
State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210 (Haw. 2005) (holding that a mother who smoked crystal meth, leading to
the death of her unborn son, could not be prosecuted for manslaughter); State v. Cervantes, 223 P.3d 425
(Or. App. 2009) (holding that ingesting drugs during pregnancy was not reckless endangerment); Ex
parte Perales, 215 S.W.3d 418 (Tx. App. 2007) (holding that a controlled substance entering a child
through the umbilical cord is not the "knowing delivery" of that substance to the child).
169. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 166, at 299. See also Flavin & Paltrow, supra note 128, at 233
("National Advocates for Pregnant Women has ... documented hundreds of known cases in at least 40
states where pregnant women who are identifed as drug users have been arrested.").
170. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 166, at 321. In addition to prosecutions, the 413 cases included
other forms of forced detention including detentions in hospitals, mental institutions, and treatment
programs, as well as forced medical interventions such as surgery. Id. at 301. The study argues that, due
to the extraordinary difficulty in obtaining data about these forced interventions and prosecutions, this
figure represents a substantial undercount of those subject to prosecution for crimes involving their
pregnancies. Id. at 303-05.
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i. The Mechanisms of Reporting: From the Health Care Setting to
Child Welfare and Law Enforcement
Despite the prevailing weight of judicial opinions holding that these
prosecutions are not lawful, in January of 2013, the Alabama Supreme Court
held in Ex parte Ankrom17 1 that the term "child" found within Alabama's child
endangerment statute included a fetus. In so holding, the court upheld the
convictions of Hope Ankrom and Amanda Kimbrough based on their use of
controlled substances during their pregnancies. This case, like its counterpart in
South Carolina, raises a whole host of concerns related to reproductive justice.
For the purposes of this article, however, what is striking is that the facts in
both prosecutions demonstrate the phenomenon of regulatory intersectionality.
In the Ankrom case, for instance, the parties stipulated to the following facts:
On January 31, 2009, the defendant, Hope Ankrom, gave birth to a
son, [B.W.], at Medical Center Enterprise. Medical records showed
that the defendant tested positive for cocaine prior to giving birth and
that the child tested positive for cocaine after birth. . . . Department of
Human Resources worker Ashley Arnold became involved and
developed a plan for the care of the child. During the investigation the
defendant admitted to Ashley that she had used marijuana while she
was pregnant but denied using cocaine. Medical records from her
doctor show that . .. she had tested positive for cocaine and marijuana
on more than one occasion during her pregnancy.172
In this case, the prosecution was facilitated by the drug tests conducted by
health-care providers both during and after the pregnancy, the referral to child
protective services, the collection of information by health-care and child-
protective service staff, and the subsequent use of that information in the
criminal prosecution of Ms. Ankrom. The facts in Ms. Kimbrough's
prosecution reveal the same set of intersecting regulatory mechanisms. As
recited by the Alabama Supreme Court, in Ms. Kimbrough's case,
[t]he Colbert County Department of Human Resources ('DHR') was
notified regarding Kimbrough's testing positive for methamphetamine
and Timmy's death, and Kimbrough's other two children were
temporarily removed from her home and placed with Kimbrough's
mother. A DHR social worker spoke with Kimbrough regarding a
safety plan for her children on two occasions. During one of those
conversations, Kimbrough admitted that she had smoked
171. ExparteAnkrom,2013 WL 135748,1.
172. Id.
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methamphetamine with a friend three days before she had experienced
labor pains. In July 2008, after having determined that the children
would be safe in Kimbrough's home, DHR returned Kimbrough's
children to her custody. 173
Thus, in Kimbrough's case too, the information about drug use started with
the health-care system, was transmitted to the child protective agency, and was
ultimately crucial to support the prosecution. Kimbrough's facts are particularly
striking in that the purpose of the conversation between Kimbrough and the
child protection worker was ostensibly benevolent. According to the court, the
child protection agency held out that they were interviewing Kimbrough for the
purpose of creating a "safety plan" for her family. It was during those
conversations that Kimbrough admitted to drug use during her pregnancy.
Moreover, the agency ultimately concluded that Kimbrough's home was safe
for her two other children, and those children were returned to her care. Despite
this, the admission of drug use by Kimbrough was ultimately utilized not to
facilitate the safety of her children but to prosecute Ms. Kimbrough and
sentence her to the mandatory statutory minimum penalty: ten years in prison.
Paltrow and Flavin's study confirms that the pattern revealed in the
Anrkom case is characteristic of the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality.
Paltrow and Flavin traced the "mechanisms by which the case came to the
attention of police, prosecutors and courts." 7 4 In 112 of the 413 cases
examined, disclosure came from "health care, drug treatment or social work
professionals." In 47 cases, "health care and hospital-based social work
professionals disclosed confidential information about pregnant women to child
welfare or social service authorities, who in turn reported the case to the
police." 75 As Paltrow and Flavin describe it, "[flar from being a bulwark
against outside intrusion and protecting patient privacy and confidentiality, we
find that health care and other 'helping' professionals are sometimes the people
gathering information from pregnant women and new mothers and disclosing it
to police, prosecutors and court officials." 7 6
6. The Disproportionate Impact on Poor African-American Women
At every step along the way, the intersectional and escalating punitive
impact of drug testing of pregnant women falls disproportionately on poor
African-American women.177
173. Id. at 4.
174. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 166, at 326.
175. Id. at 326-27.
176. Id. at 327.
177. Although it would certainly be important to trace these phenomena for other communities of
color, I focus on the African-American community for two reasons. First, the majority of available data
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As detailed above, the process of regulatory intersectionality begins with
the decision to administer a drug test to the mother or infant. A recent study
tested whether race is used as a factor in deciding whether to test newborns
when detailed protocols that do not include race as a screening factor are
already in place to guide the decision to test the newborn.178 After examining
the records of 2,121 mother-infant pairs, the researchers discovered that,
despite the existence of detailed protocols dictating when testing should occur,
35.1% of infants born to black mothers who met the screening criteria were
tested. In contrast, only 12.9% of infants born to white women who met the
screening criteria were tested.179 The researchers therefore concluded that "race
was used as an independent criterion for screening [for illicit drugs] even at an
institution in which an established, apparently objective, screening protocol that
did not include race as a factor was in place."',
80
Other researchers have focused on the rate of referral of children to child
protective agencies. A study conducted in 1990 by Chasnoff et al. as well as a
more recent 2012 study conducted by Sarah Roberts and Amani Nuru-Jeter
provide compelling data on the extent of disproportionality in the rate of
referrals. Chasnoff et al. sought to determine the rate of drug use among
pregnant women throughout public and private health care facilities and to
explore whether the rates of reporting drug test results correlated with the rates
of drug use. They conducted the study shortly after Florida adopted a statewide
policy mandating "the reporting [to the Department of Health] of births to
mother who used drugs or alcohol during pregnancy." '8 Pursuant to state
policy, a positive toxicology screen from either the mother or the child was
sufficient to require such a report.182
During a one-month period, the researchers obtained a urine sample from
"every woman who enrolled for prenatal care . . . at each of the five Pinellas
County Health Unit Clinics and from every woman who entered prenatal care .
. . at the offices of each of 12 private obstetrical practices in the county.', 8 3 In
total they obtained samples from 715 women. The results across race and class
were striking. Of the 715 women, 14.8% tested positive for alcohol,
cannabinoids (marijuana), cocaine or opiates. A slightly higher percentage of
has more detailed and reliable information for African-Americans as opposed to other groups. Second,
given the targeting of social welfare, child welfare, and criminal justice mechanisms at poor African-
American communities in particular, this analysis is an important place to start.
178. Marc A. Ellsworth, Timothy P. Stevens & Carl T. D'Angio, Infant Race Affects Application of
Clinical Guidelines When Screening for Drugs ofAbuse in Newborns, 125 PEDIATRICS 1379 (2010).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1383. The researchers also found that ""criteria indicating screening should be
performed seemed to be selectively ignored.. . for infants born to white women." Id.
181. Ira J. Chasnoff, Harvey J. Landress & Mark E. Barrett, The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug and
Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County Florida,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990).
182. Id. at 1203.
183. Id.
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white women (15.4%) than black women (14.1%) tested positive for these
substances. As to socioeconomic status, which the researchers determined from
the economic demographics of the zip code in which women lived, the
researchers concluded that "socioeconomic status . . . did not predict a positive
result on toxicologic testing."l 84 Despite essentially equivalent rates of positive
toxicology screens across race and class, only 1.1% of white women were
reported, whereas 10.7% of black women were reported: "[t]hus, a black
woman was 9.6 times more likely than a white woman to be reported for
substance abuse during pregnancy."' 85
Roberts and Nuru-Jeter's study suggests similar findings. Relying on a
variety of government data collected for administrative reasons, Roberts and
Nuru-Jeter examined data from providers in California that had implemented
universal testing of pregnant women for drug and alcohol use.186 They sought
to determine whether drug and alcohol use varied by race and whether there
were disparities in reporting by race. They concluded that, "[d]espite Black
women having alcohol-drug use identified by prenatal providers at similar rates
to White women and entering treatment more than expected, Black newborns
were four times more likely than White newborns to be reported to [Child
Protective Services] at delivery."' 87 Moreover, the study authors also noted
that, due to some differences among the data sets that they drew on in order to
reach their findings, it is likely that African-American children were reported at
even more disproportionate rates than their data suggests.' 88
It is also the case that the criminal prosecution of pregnant women for
crimes arising from their pregnancies falls disproportionately on poor African-
American women. Of the 368 women' 8 9 in the Paltrow and Flavin study for
which the race of the woman was available, 59% of those women were women
of color and 52% were African-American.190 African-American women were
particularly overrepresented in the South, and were also more likely to be more
harshly prosecuted. Of the 354 cases involving prosecutions, 295 were felony
184. Id. at 1204.
185. Id.
186. Sarah C.M. Roberts & Amani Nuru-Jeter, Universal Screening for Alcohol and Drug Use and
Racial Disparities in Child Protective Services Reporting, 39 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES & RES. 3
(2012).
187. Id. at 3.
188. Id. at 14-15 (explaining that, due to some variations in information available in the multiple
data sets they used to reach their conclusions, "comparison of racial distributions of identification data
(including the data from the private provider) and reporting data would be expected to show an even
greater overrepresentation of Black women among those reported to CPS than among those identified
through screening in prenatal care.").
189. Paltrow & Flavin's study focused on 413 cases in which "a woman's pregnancy was a
necessary factor leading to attempted or actual deprivations of the woman's physical liberty." Paltrow &
Flavin, supra note 166, at 299. Of those 413, data on the race of the woman involved was only available




prosecutions.191 While 71% of the white women were charged with felonies,
85% of the African-American women were charged with felonies. 192 In
addition, 71% of the women in the study qualified for indigent defense, a clear
indication that these state interventions disproportionately affect poor
193women.
B. Applying for Welfare: Drug Testing, Child Protection Interventions, and
Criminal Prosecutions
In recent years, Congress and state legislatures across the country have
considered, and in seven states passed, legislation to condition the receipt of
TANF benefits on consenting to and passing a drug test. In comparison to the
research on pregnant women and drug use discussed above, we know very little
about how these programs actually operate, whom they affect and how, and the
extent and mechanisms of transmission of information from this part of the
welfare system into the child protective and criminal systems. Although we do
know in general that punitive policies in the welfare context tend to be targeted
disproportionately at recipients of color,1 9 4 we do not have specific data to
indicate that that this is occurring in welfare drug testing programs or at the
intersections of those programs and other systems. This lack of information
comes in part from the relative newness of these programs and in part from the
lack of scholars from other disciplines that focus on these issues. Nevertheless,
this article highlights this example for a few reasons. First, given the growing
trend within state legislatures to institute drug testing as part of their welfare
programs, the information below highlights how variations in how statutes are
framed can matter a great deal for those who need welfare. To that extent, it
gives some information to advocates trying to oppose or shape these programs.
In addition, while the majority of scholarship to date on welfare drug testing
has focused on the Fourth Amendment and unconstitutional conditions issues at
play,195 this article highlights how, in this relatively new area of social welfare
19 1. Id.
192. Id. at 322.
193. Id.at3ll.
194. See Hearing Series on Welfare Reform, Work Requirements on the TANF Cash Welfare
Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means,
107th Cong. 60-69 (2001) (statement of Steve Savner, Senior Staff Att'y, Ctr. for Law & Soc. Policy).
National data suggests that both the outcome and the quality of service provision in welfare programs
vary along race lines. For example, data measuring "leavers," or households exiting welfare, in Illinois
from June 1997 to June 1999 revealed racial disparities in the reasons for case closure: "A total of
340,958 cases closed . . . . of which 102,423 were whites and 238,535 were minorities. Fifty-four
percent of minority cases, but only 39 percent of white cases, closed because the recipient failed to
comply with program rules." Id. at 65. In addition, various studies indicate better treatment of white
recipients than African-American recipients in regard to positive encouragement and assistance in job
searches and provision of supportive assistance such as transportation help. Id.
195. See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing and the
Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 751 (2011); Walker Newell, Tax Dollars
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policy, all the pieces are being put in place to use these systems to impose ever
escalating punitive consequences on those who seek aid. In this sense,
describing it in this way again provides fodder for those who seek grounds to
expose the punitive nature of these programs. Finally, noting the way that
regulatory mechanisms are being put in place to facilitate the imposition of
ever-escalating consequences in this relatively new program provides further
evidence of its significance as a key feature of how we govern through social
welfare programs.
1. Welfare Drug Testing: Federal Authority and a Trend on the Rise
This legislative trend finds its roots in the devolution of welfare policy
embodied in the 1996 welfare reform law. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), legislation that fundamentally altered the domestic social safety
net by eliminating the entitlement to cash assistance for needy families with
dependent children, eliminating benefits for a wide range of lawful immigrants
and, among other key elements, devolving significant authority for designing
the newly-termed Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (hereinafter TANF)
to the states. To guide states in exercising their newly-devolved authority, the
legislation included a series of provisions permitting the states to include
various features in their TANF program. For example, although the PRWORA
generally bars receipt of TANF benefits to adults after five years, states are
authorized to, and in fact have, significantly shortened that period of time. 196
Similarly, the PRWORA includes a provision authorizing states to condition
receipt of benefits under the TANF program to those who do not test positive
for drugs. As the legislation states, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law, States shall not be prohibited by the Federal Government from testing
welfare recipients for use of controlled substances nor from sanctioning welfare
recipients who test positive for use of controlled substances." 97 Although in
the several years directly following welfare reform, the focus of state activity
around drug abuse was on screening, referral to treatment, and drug felony
bans,198 in the last several years, there has been an increasing focus on drug
testing in both TANF and other public benefit programs.
Earmarked for Drugs? The Policy and Constitutionality of Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, 43 CoLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215 (2011); Frank G. Barile, Note and Comment, Learning from Lebron: The
Suspicionless Drug Testing of TANF Applicants, 26 J. Civ. RTs. & ECON. DEv. 789 (2012); Ilan
Wurman, Note, Drug Testing Welfare Recipients As an Unconstitutional Condition, 65 STAN. L. REV.
1153 (2013).
196. 42 U.S.C. §608(a)(7) (2012).
197. 21 U.S.C. § 862(b) (1996).
198. See Office of the Assistant Sec'y for Planning and Evaluation, ASPE Issue Brief Drug Testing
Welfare Recipients: Recent Proposals and Continuing Controversies, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES (2011), http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/l 1/DrugTesting/ib.pdf.
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The trend toward conditioning receipt of public benefits on passing drug
tests began in earnest late in 2009, when over twenty states proposed
legislation. Over the course of the next several years, despite an unfavorable
court ruling holding that suspicionless drug testing programs cannot survive
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment,199 states continued to try to enact this
200legislation2. In 2010, at least twelve states proposed legislation mandating
drug testing of welfare recipients. In 2011, bills were introduced in thirty-six
201states. In addition, twelve legislatures proposed drug testing for
unemployment benefits and two cities, Chicago, Illinois and Flint, Michigan,
proposed a program to ban those who fail a drug test from public housing.202 n
203
2012, at least twenty-eight states proposed such legislation. In addition, in
2012, Congress enacted a provision authorizing states to condition receipt of
unemployment benefits, in some circumstances, on passing a drug test.204 Since
the 2012 presidential election, legislators in at least four states have said they
will introduce or have introduced bills.205 Today, seven states - Arizona,
Florida, Missouri, Tennessee, Georgia, Ohio and Utah - have enacted welfare
199. Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, 309 F.3d 330 (6th
Cir. 2002), reh'g granted en banc, vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003), affd by an equally divided
court, 60 F. Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2003). The state of Michigan was the first state to enact a suspicionless
drug testing provision that led to denial of benefits. This program, which was enacted in 1999, was
immediately challenged and enjoined by the District Court. The District Court held that Michigan's
suspicionless drug testing program violated the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
initially reversed that opinion only to have the case accepted for hearing en banc. The en bane court split
down the middle, with half of the justices voting for affirmance and half voting for reversal. The result
in the case was therefore affirmative of the District Court's opinion. Despite the fact that, for the
purposes of the Michigan program the provisions are unconstitutional, the split between the judges and
between the District and the original appellate bench that heard the case clearly indicate that the law in
this area remains profoundly unsettled. More recently, the District Court in the Middle District of
Florida preliminarily enjoined Florida's suspicionless drug testing program. See Lebron v. Wilkins, 820
F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The case is currently being appealed.
200. See Drug Testing and Public Assistance, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-assistance.aspx (last
updated Apr. 17, 2013) ("In 2009, over 20 states proposed legislation that would require drug testing as
a condition of eligibility for public assistance programs. In 2010 at least 12 states had similar
proposals.").
201. Id.
202. A.G. Sulzberger, States Adding Drug Test as Hurdle for Welfare, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/20 11/10/11/us/states-adding-drug-test-as-hurdle-for-welfare.html?r-0.
203. Drug Testing and Public Assistance, supra note 200 ("At least 28 states put forth proposals
requiring drug testing for public assistance applicants or recipients in 2012.").
204. Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, sec. 2105, § 303,
126 Stat 156, 162-63 (2012) (allowing states to condition receipt of unemployment benefits on passing a
drug test for any applicant who, "(i) was terminated from employment with the applicant's most recent
employer (as defined under the State law) because of the unlawful use of controlled substances; or (ii) is
an individual for whom suitable work (as defined under the State law) is only available in an occupation
that regularly conducts drug testing (as determined under regulations issued by the Secretary of
Labor)").
205. Morgan Whitaker, More States Consider Welfare Drug-Testing Bills, MSNBC (Dec. 7, 2012,
5:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/politicsnation/more-states-consider-welfare-drug-testing-bil ("Ohio,
Virginia, and Kansas are not the first states to take up the measure since Election Day. Lone Star State
Gov. Rick Perry himself filed a bill in the Texas state legislature in mid-November...").
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drug testing programs that allow for partial or complete denial of benefits for
refusing to take or failure to pass a drug test.206
Both the enacted and the vast swath of proposed legislation vary
significantly on several key issues: the severity of the penalty imposed;207 the
emphasis on sanction versus treatment;208 and crucially for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, whether or not the state must have some reasonable
suspicion before testing.20 9 States law and legislative proposals also vary as to
what public benefits are included, ranging from proposals that limit testing to
TANF to proposals that include TANF, Supplemental Assistance to Needy
Families (formerly termed Food Stamps), unemployment and Medicaid.
2. The Penalty for Failing a Drug Test Within the TANF Program
Although each statute imposes a penalty on the applicant and/or the
applicant's dependent children for the applicant's failure or refusal of the drug
test, the penalties vary substantially. For example, in Arizona applicants who
fail or refuse a drug screen are ineligible for benefits for one calendar year. 2 10
In other states the penalties are progressive, based on the number of times one
fails a drug screen. For example, in Georgia the first time one fails the applicant
loses one month of benefits, but subsequent failed tests lead to progressively
longer sanctions. In addition, some states will allow applicants to receive
benefits if they enroll in or once they have completed drug treatment. For
example, in Tennessee, if an applicant enrolls in drug treatment, they can
receive benefits for six months while in treatment. If the applicant refuses
treatment or is positive at the end of treatment, benefits are denied for at least
six months. Similarly, in Oklahoma, if one enters treatment, the penalty can be
reduced to from twelve months to six months without benefits. However, it is
important to note that no state legislation creating drug testing mandates
include provisions giving priority for drug treatment to welfare applicants nor
206. Drug Testing and Public Assistance, supra note 200.
207. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193(d) (West 2012) (imposing progressive sanctions based
on the number of positive tests beginning with a one month sanction) with H.B. 2002, 51st Leg., Ist
Spec. Sess. ch. 2 §14 (Ariz. 2013) (imposing one year sanction for testing positive).
208. Compare H.B. 2002, 51st Leg., Ist Spec. Sess. ch. 2 §14 (Ariz. 2013) (imposing one year
sanction for testing positive) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-3-1202(h)(1) (West 2012) (allowing
individuals who test positive to receive benefits for six months while in treatment).
209. Compare Mo. ANN. STAT § 208.027(l) (West 2012) (requiring that the Department of Social
Services, "screen each applicant or recipient who is otherwise eligible for temporary assistance for
needy families benefits under this chapter, and then test, using a urine dipstick five panel test, each one
who the department has reasonable cause to believe, based on the screening, engages in illegal use of
controlled substances . . .") with GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193(c) (West 2012) (requiring a drug test for
"each individual who applies for assistance"). For an extensive summary of proposed and enacted
legislation as of 2011, see Drug Testing Welfare Recipients: Recent Proposals and Continuing
Controversies, supra note 197, at Appendix A.
210. H.B. 2002, 51st Leg., Ist Spec. Sess. ch. 2 §14 (Ariz. 2013) (denying benefits for one year as a
result of a positive drug test).
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are there any provisions within those statutes granting additional funding for
drug treatment. Given the overall dearth of drug treatment programs for the
poor, 211 the inclusion of provisions allowing individuals to receive benefits as
long as they are in treatment is somewhat disingenuous.
In looking at this program through the lens of regulatory intersectionality,
it is important to understand the financial consequence to the family for what
the program defines as sanctionable or deviant conduct, which in this case is
the failure or refusal of a drug screen. In evaluating the nature and severity of
this consequence, it is helpful to keep a few facts in mind. First, in order to
qualify for TANF benefits, you must, among other criteria, be extremely poor.
Take as an example a three-person household with one adult, one pre-school
age child, and one school-age child living in Phoenix, Arizona. That family
would not qualify for benefits if they have countable income in excess of
Arizona's defined standard of need for their family size: for this family of
three, they could only qualify for TANF benefits if they have less than $964 in
monthly income.212 That same family, however, would not receive $964 in
TANF benefits were they accepted into the program. Instead, if all three
household members received benefits, they would receive a maximum of $278
20per month, or $3,336 per year.213 If the adult in that family fails or refuses the
drug screen, the family would receive, for an entire calendar year, benefits only
for the two children.214 Their TANF grant would then be reduced by 21% from
$278 per month to a mere $220 per month, or $2,640 per year.215
To understand just how low this cash grant is, it is helpful to compare it to
two different measures. A first point of comparison is the federal poverty
threshold, a measure that is nearly universally acknowledged as outdated and is
regarded in many quarters as far too low.216 The Arizona family of three would
fall below the federal poverty line if they earned less than $19,090 in income
217
per year. So the reduced cash grant that results from the drug test sanction
lowers the families cash assistance from 18% of the federal poverty level for
full benefits to 14% of the poverty level once the sanction is imposed.
Another useful way to look at these numbers is to compare the family's
income under the sanction to what they actually need to meet basic needs. The
211. Victor Capoccia, Dennis McCarty & Laura Schmidt, Closing the Addiction Treatment Gap: A
Priority for Health Care Reform, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY AND OPPORTUNITY, (May 3, 2010)
http://www.spotlightonpoverty.org/ExclusiveCommentary.aspx?id-049a9de2-al fc-447e-b36d-
3ac90e0bcal0.
212. See Cash Assistance Al Needs Standards, ARIz. DEP'T OF ECON. SECURITY,
https://www.azdes.gov/popup.aspx?id=5422 (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
213. See id.
214. H.B. 2002, 51st Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 2 §14 (Ariz. 2013).
215. See Cash Assistance Al Needs Standards, supra note 212.
216. For an in-depth discussion of the insufficiency of the current federal poverty measure, see
Bach, supra note 83, at 278-81.
217. See 2012 Poverty Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4035 (January 26, 2012),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/12poverty.shtml.
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Center for Women's Welfare at the University of Washington School of Social
Work and its director Diana Pierce developed the Self-Sufficiency Standard to
assist in such analysis. 2 18 The standard provides a rigorous methodology for
calculating how much income particular families, in particular geographic
locations, need to meet their basic needs 219 without public or private assistance.
According to the 2012 Arizona Self-Sufficiency Standard, were our
hypothetical family of three to receive no private or public assistance
whatsoever, the adult would need to work full time and earn $24.20 per hour
for a total of $51,115 in income per year to meet all the families' basic
220needs. Even if one makes the optimistic assumption that this family is
receiving other benefits, such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance, Medicaid,
and, perhaps if they are very lucky, subsidized housing, losing $696 in annual
income is a devastating blow.
3. Welfare Drug Testing at the Intersections: Intervention by Child
Protective and Criminal Justice Systems
The penalty to the family for the failed or refused drug screen does not stop
at the drastic reduction in their already tremendously low level of assistance.
The second aspect of regulatory intersectionality describes what else might
happen to this family as a result of the stigmatized conduct. As noted above,
one variable along which various welfare drug-testing statutes differ is the
extent of privacy protections built into the legislation. Of particular interest, for
the purposes of discussing regulatory intersectionality, are provisions
concerning the sharing of this information among government agencies. These
include provisions that allow or mandate the sharing of results with child
protective agencies, require some level of child protective investigation, and
raise the specter of data-sharing with criminal justice agencies.
When looking at these intersecting system phenomena, it is crucial to keep
in mind some basic background rules in the area. First, although the extent of
privacy protections for drug tests has been eroding in a variety of contexts, 221it
remains true that requiring individuals to consent to a drug test which requires
that person to urinate, likely in the presence of a government employee, and
218. For additional information on the standard, see generally The Self-Sufficiency Standard, THE
CTR. FOR WOMEN'S WELFARE, http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/standard.html (last visited Sept.
26, 2013).
219. Under the standards methodology, basic needs include geographically specific calculations of
expenses in six categories: housing, childcare, food, transportation, healthcare and an additional 10% in
miscellaneous expenses. How is the Self-Sufficiency Standard Calculated, THE CTR. FOR WOMEN'S
WELFARE, http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/standard.html#howis (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
220. Diana M. Pearce, How Much Is Enough In Your County? The Self-Sufficiency Standard for
Arizona 2012, CTR. FOR WOMEN'S WELFARE 59 (May 2012),
http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/docs/Arizona-2012.pdf.
221. See supra note 102.
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then give that urine sample to the agency, invades a long-protected and long-
recognized zone of bodily integrity and privacy. As the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has stated, "[t]here are few activities in our society more
personal or private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by
euphemisms if they talk about it at all." 222 For this reason, the Supreme Court
in Skinner v. Oklahoma made clear that a mandatory urinalysis constitutes a
search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.223
Moreover, as was the case in the health care setting described above, even
before the advent of this spate of welfare drug-testing legislation, welfare
officials across the nation224 and in six of the seven states that have enacted
welfare drug testing programs were already required to report suspected abuse
225to child protective agencies. Thus, the mechanisms to facilitate and in some
cases mandate reporting and investigation in light of a positive drug test seem
at best superfluous and at worst, yet another hyperregulatory mechanism to
target, punish and criminalize poor African-American mothers.
Jurisdictions vary significantly in the use and strength of privacy
protections. One jurisdiction appears to bar the use of test results in collateral
investigations and proceedings; many are silent, and a few permit disclosure. In
two jurisdictions, however, the programs go beyond permissive disclosure, and
instead mandate disclosure to, and in some cases require intervention by, child
protection agencies. In addition, in many jurisdictions, results of welfare drug
tests are available to police and prosecutors. In these cases, the programs seem
to be designed to snowball the possible detrimental effect of the positive test far
beyond the sanction included in the statute and described above.
Of the seven states that have enacted welfare drug testing programs to date,
the statute enacted in Georgia is the only one that appears to provide a
comprehensive ban on the use of test results in other investigations and
proceedings. The statute provides that,
222. Nat'l Treasury Emp. Union v. Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (1987).
223. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
224. See, e.g., Child Welfare Information Gateway, Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse and
Neglect at 2, https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/manda.pdf
("Approximately 48 States, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands designate professions whose members are mandated by law
to report child maltreatment. Individuals designated as mandatory reporters typically have frequent
contact with children. Such individuals may include ... Social workers; Teachers, principals, and other
school personnel; Physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers; Counselors, therapists, and other
mental health professionals; Child care providers; Medical examiners or coroners, Law enforcement
officers."). See also Kathryn Krase, Making the Tough Call: Social Workers as Mandated Reporters,
THE NEW SOCIAL WORKER: THE SOCIAL WORK CAREER MAGAZINE (Apr. 6, 2013)
http://www.socialworker.com/feature-
articles/practice/Making theToughCall%3A Social Workers asMandatedReporters PartI/.
225. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West 2013); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (West 2013); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN.
§62A-4a-403 (West 2013).
2014]1 363
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
[t]he results of any drug test done according to this Code section ...
shall not be used as a part of a criminal investigation or criminal
prosecution. Such results shall not be used in a civil action or
otherwise disclosed to any person or entity without the express written
consent of the person tested or his or her heirs or legal
representative.226
In contrast to the Georgia provision, most statutes enacted in the past
several years allow disclosure of the drug test results to some or all government
agencies. For example, while the Oklahoma and Arizona statutes are silent on
the issue of privacy protection,227 each state's general records access provision
228allow the sharing of data between government agencies. Similarly, although
the Utah statute bars public disclosure of the test results,229 underlying records
access provisions allow government agencies to provide data to any entity that
"enforces, litigates, or investigates civil, criminal, or administrative law, and
the record is necessary to a proceeding or investigation." 230 Tennessee's statute
is more restrictive, barring the use of all information received by the
department in connection with the drug testing program, "in any public or
private proceeding. . . 231 However an exception is carved out for any
proceeding, "concerning the protection or permanency of children." 232  In
addition, although the ban clearly forbids the use of the drug test results in
formal proceedings, there appears to be no ban on using them in investigations
of any criminal or civil nature, thus leaving open the possibility that the results
could be shared with child protection agencies and police.
Two states, Florida and Missouri, go beyond permissive sharing of data to
mandate data transmission and investigation by the child protective agencies.
The underlying statutes also clearly allow the use of positive drug tests in
226. GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193 (2012).
227. The silence of the particular welfare drug testing statutes in these states could very well mean,
as was the case in Florida, that in implementing the statute, the agencies will enact policies that mandate
reporting and action by other parts of the state administrative structure. For a discussion of how this
occurred in Florida, see infra notes 232-234 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-807 (2013) (requiring disclosure of child protection
records to various government entities to enable such entities, "to meet their duties to provide for the
safety, permanency and well-being of a child, provide services to a parent, guardian or custodian or
provide services to family members to strengthen the family pursuant to this chapter; . . . [t]o enforce or
prosecute any violation involving child abuse or neglect.. .. [and tJo provide information to a defendant
after a criminal charge has been filed as required by an order of the criminal court.); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. IOA, § 1-6-103 (1993) (allowing inspections without a court order of Juvenile and Department of
Human Services records by offices of the Attorney General, and law enforcement personnel).
229. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-3-304.5(5) (West 2012) ("The result of a drug test given under this
section is a private record in accordance with Section 63G-2-302 and disclosure to a third party is
prohibited except as provided under Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and
Management Act.").
230. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-206(l)(b) (West 2013).




criminal prosecutions. Like some of the statutes discussed above, the Florida
statute that implemented the drug testing program was silent as to the issue of
privacy and data sharing.233 Nevertheless when designing the program's
implementation, the Florida Department of Children and Families instituted
procedures that included the sharing of positive drug tests with the Florida
Abuse Hotline.2 34 As described by the District Court in its decision enjoining
the Florida program,
DCF shares all positive drug tests for controlled substances with the
Florida Abuse Hotline. . . . After receiving a positive drug test, a
hotline counselor enters a Parent Needs Assistance referral into a child
welfare database known as the Florida Safe Families Network. . . A
referral is then prepared ... so that 'other appropriate response to the
referral in the particular county of residence of the applicant' may be
taken... . The statute governing the Florida Abuse Hotline authorizes
the disclosure of records from the abuse hotline to '[c]riminal justice
agencies of appropriate jurisdiction,' as well as '[t]he state attorney of
the judicial circuit in which the child resides or in which the alleged
abuse or neglect occurred.' Law enforcement officials may access the
Florida Safe Families Network and make such use of the data as they
see fit.235
The Missouri statute is explicit and, unlike any of the other statutes,
mandates reporting not only for those who test positive for drugs but for all
those who refuse to take a drug test. The statute provides that "[c]ase workers
[who have knowledge that an applicant has either failed or refused a drug test] .
shall be required to report or cause a report to be made to the children's
division .. . for suspected child abuse as a result of drug abuse."236
4. Disproportionality
As noted above, in contrast to the health settings, there are no studies
looking specifically at the question of whether welfare drug testing policies are
administered in ways that vary by the race of the welfare recipient or that
negatively and disproportionately impact African-American clients of the
233. FLA. STAT. ANN. §414.0652 (West 2011).
234. Complaint at 10, Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 6:11 Civ.
01473) (stating that applicants are required to sign a "Drug Testing Information Acknowledgement and
Consent Release" which includes, among other provisions, that applicants consent that "[i]nformation on
a failed test will be shared with the Florida Abuse Hotline for review to initiate an assessment or an offer
of services.").
235. LeBron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citations omitted).
236. Mo. ANN. STATE §208.027(2) (West 2011).
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system. There is, however, a good deal of information to merit worry that these
policies will, like the drug testing policies in the healthcare setting, have these
impacts. A few bodies of research justify this concern.
First, as to the question of disproportionate impact in the initial general
welfare system, researchers have looked at the impact of punitive welfare
policies by race and have concluded that punitive policies are targeted
disproportionately at clients of color. 23 7 In addition, for those programs that
involve the use of discretion, it is quite clear, as it was in the healthcare setting,
that the existence of discretion correlates with disproportionate targeting of
poor African-American women. Moving beyond the initial welfare setting and
to the intersections that arise from reporting out, we do know as a general
matter that African-American children are referred to child welfare agencies in
numbers far outweighing their percentage of the population.238 Once there, as
Dorothy Roberts and others have compellingly described, African-American
239families suffer outcomes far worse than their white counterparts. Similarly,
many scholars, including Wacquant and Alexander, have demonstrated that the
criminal justice system impacts, and is in fact targeted at, communities of color
in general and at the African-American community in particular. 24 0 Given all
this data and the fact that the statutory and regulatory framework of welfare
drug testing is structurally very similar to the structure in the health care
setting, there is good reason to assume that the use of drug testing in welfare
programs will also result in disproportionate punishment of African-American
families.
IV. REGULATORY INTERSECTIONALITY, HYPERREGULATION AND THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE: IMPLICATIONS AND THEORIZING A PATH
At this point, several arguments should be clear. First, as described in Part
III, the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality are strongly present in the
social support programs available to poor communities in the United States.
The result of this is a state that exacts an enormous punitive toll for seeking
support. Second, as suggested in Part II, the mechanisms of regulatory
intersectionality contribute to what is here described as the hyperregulatory
state. This means that programs of the social safety net are targeted, by race,
class, place, and gender, to control and subordinate low-income communities in
general and low-income communities of color in particular. In both examples
237. See Sanford F. Schram, Contextualizing Racial Disparities in American Welfare Reform:
Toward a New Poverty Research, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 253 (2005).
238. See supra note 89.
239. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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laid out in Part II, punitive consequences were clearly meted out
241
disproportionately to poor African-American women.
If these arguments are true, if the state is not merely non-responsive but is
instead characterized by the specific phenomena of regulatory intersectionality
and the broader mechanisms of hyperregulation, then this analysis has
significant implications for theorizing a road to a supportive state. Returning to
the crucial task of theorizing and building an autonomy-enhancing, supportive
state, what should be clear initially is that we have a very long and complicated
road ahead. We have, in short, many assumptions to challenge and much to
dismantle before we can begin to build. While the primary purpose of this
article is to describe the functioning of regulatory intersectionality in detail and
frame that specific phenomena in the broader frame of hyperregulation, what
follows below is a brief discussion of some of the lived and theoretical
implications, a more detailed analysis of the relationship between vulnerability,
regulatory intersectionality, and hyperregulation, some more practical strategies
that might hold promise and a cautionary note about the current emphasis
within social welfare policy on collaboration. Necessarily at this point, what
follows raises more questions than it answers.
A. Hyperregulation, Vulnerability, Need, and Trust
Perhaps the most important way to start is by drawing out the lived
implications of the phenomena described above. Given the pervasiveness of
hyperregulatory structures in poor communities, one need not speculate much
in order to understand why many poor women view America's safety net with
enormous distrust. It is no secret, in poor communities in the United States, that
seeking support involves extraordinary risk. Listening to the voices of women
interviewed by Dorothy Roberts in her study of the child welfare system is a
strong reminder of this distrust. As part of her study, Roberts interviewed an
African-American woman from Chicago who described her own needs and the
punitive role of child welfare agencies in her community. In the woman's
words, one can recognize both a profound need and well-founded distrust of
those who would offer "welfare" to her children:
[Tihe advertisement [for the child abuse hotline], it just says abuse. If
you being abused, this is the number you call, this is the only way you
gonna get help. It doesn't say if I'm in need of counseling, or if ... my
241. It is important to note that the question of whether the targeting of these mechanisms is
intentional or not is largely irrelevant too. The argument here is that these many hyperregulatory
mechanisms (criminalization, deprivations of basic privacy, regulatory intersectionality and many more)
operate, by race, gender, class and socioeconomic status, to exert social control and to subordinate
particular poor communities.
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children don't have shoes, if I just can't provide groceries even though
I may have seven kids, but I only get a hundred something dollars food
stamps. And my work check only goes to bills. I can't feed eight of us
all off a hundred something dollar food stamps.... I don't want to lose
my children, so I'm not going to call [Department of Children and
Family Services] for help because I only see them take away
children. 24 2
Given how the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality function to exact
ever-escalating punishments on women who seek support, this woman's words
are unsurprising.
As to the implications for theory, it is helpful to return to Fineman's
concept of vulnerability (or Eichner's concept of dependency), which
maintains, at its heart, that we are all vulnerable (or dependent) and that any
243theory of the state needs to proceed from this assumption. In light of what is
described above, though, it is both profoundly true and yet insufficient to
describe women faced with these circumstances as vulnerable. These particular
women certainly enter the social welfare state in a state of vulnerability, but
once they enter, the mechanisms of the state are structured to render them more
and more vulnerable, and more and more exposed to punishment and social
control. In the examples described above, women who enter those systems and
are deemed deviant or noncompliant, are punished within the social welfare
program. The women seeking prenatal care are stripped of their rights to
privacy and confidentiality and deterred from accessing essential health care.24
Women seeking welfare face not only the clear violation of privacy involved in
submitting to a urine-based drug test, but they also face denial, reduction, or
245termination of the already meager aid offered by the program. But the
system is not punitive only in the sense of imposing punishment as a price of
support. Instead, the above analysis reveals these systems as hyperregulatory in
the sense that Wacquant describes.246 These social support structures,
characterized by regulatory intersectionality, are structured to exact ever-
escalating consequences for the woman's deviant conduct. They are also
hyperregulatory in the sense that they are targeted toward specific
communities. They exact these ever-escalating punitive consequences
disproportionately on poor African-American women and poor African-
American communities. Being enmeshed in these intersecting systems is thus
the price of seeking support. A woman or family entering these systems is
242. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Racial Geography of Child Welfare: Toward a New Research
Paradigm, 87 CHILD WELFARE 125, 145-46 (2008) (quoting a woman named Michelle).
243. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Subsection III(A)(2).
245. See supra notes 210-215 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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certainly vulnerable and in need before seeking assistance from the state. While
seeking support may meet some very important need in the short term (one for
which women are clearly willing to pay an extraordinary potential cost), it runs
the substantial risk of rendering her more, rather than less, vulnerable. She is,
once she seeks support, vulnerable not only because we all are and because
meeting one's needs while living in poverty is extraordinarily difficult, but she
is vulnerable to escalating punishment by the state.
Moreover, as is the case for many of the hyperregulatory mechanisms
described by scholars such as Wacquant, Roberts, Bridges, and Alexander,
these mechanisms are part and parcel of larger mechanisms of social control
that operate in poor communities. This ultimately results in distinctions by
economic status, by race, by gender, and often by place, in how the state
operates. Centering the experiences of those subject to these hyperregulatory
institutions creates a set of challenges for building a road toward the supportive
state.
B. (Re)envisioning an Autonomy Enhancing Supportive State
There is no question that we need a more responsive and supportive state.
As Peter Edelman's work reminds us, it is important to exercise care as we
condemn current support programs.247 We need to preserve what we have,
restructure it to be better, and build upon it. Welfare, food stamps, Medicaid,
public housing and other vital programs provide much less than we need, and,
as has been argued here, are in many cases part and parcel of the creation of a
hyperregulatory state. But at the same time they are tremendously important.
We certainly need those programs to be restructured, but it would be beyond
foolish to suggest that the appropriate response to the problems described in
this article is to dismantle those programs. We need instead to look critically at
the structures and administration of these programs. Beyond that, we need a
state that offers significantly more support to families across the economic
spectrum and that does so in ways that support rather than undermine the
ability of families and communities to meet their needs and their goals. When
Eichner and Roberts call for a set of supportive programs in a newly envisioned
child welfare system that offer significant assistance to families all along the
way rather than intervening only when there is a crisis (and then only to
248punish), they are calling for more and better support. The question posed by
247. See, e.g., PETER EDELMAN, So RICH, SO POOR: WHY IT'S So HARD TO END POVERTY IN
AMERICA 7-23 (2012) (briefly retelling the history of social support since the Great Depression and
arguing that in historical perspective, the current safety net, although profoundly inadequate, has strong
elements and provides significant support).
248. In the conclusion of SHATTERED BONDS, Roberts provides a compelling vision of a newly
structured child welfare system. Although she calls for changes well beyond this, an essential piece
involves shifting the emphasis to family support and preservation. As she describes it, "Federal and state
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this article is not whether we need such a supportive or responsive state. We
clearly do. Instead it asks how we might re-envision both the support programs
we already have and the ones we need in order to enhance the autonomy of
families in poverty.
1. An Autonomy-Supporting State: Abandoning Both Violations ofPrivacy
and Structures ofPunishment
On a theoretical level, in order to build a responsive state, we must
significantly expand our collective notion of what constitutes and enables the
exercise of autonomy. As explained in Part I, this involves abandoning the
flawed notion of an autonomous subject and replacing it with a conception of
the vulnerable or dependent subject. This would give rise to a state that would
be compelled to provide the material conditions necessary for people to
exercise a much more robust version of autonomy. Focusing on vulnerability or
dependency could also lead, in Fineman's vision, to far more substantive
equality.249 One mechanism to ensure this level of autonomy-enhancing
governments already spend more than $10 billion annually on the child welfare system. But most of the
money goes to maintaining children in out-of-home care. Centering the system's services on family
support and preservation would be a matter of shifting these funds from their current destructive
purpose." ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 80, at 269. Eichner provides similar vision of how
we might restructure that system: "In contrast to the existing system ... the government would funnel its
resources first and foremost into ensuring that existing families have the social support to provide for
children's well being." EICHNER, supra note 2, at 119.
249. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For a strong endorsement of the strength of these
claims to counter the subordination within the legal structures that target poor African-American
communities, see Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low Income
Women, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV (2013) (forthcoming) (arguing that "[t]he simple rhetorical transition
from using the terms "the poor" to "the vulnerable" may help shift and soften some of the disgust now
aimed at the poor. . . [A]ddressing economic vulnerability requires a material commitment to making
sure that grim failures of structural economic risk are not borne disproportionately by the most
vulnerable members of society, namely low-income women of color and their children. The existence of
deep poverty in the United States is not a sign of widespread behavioral failures by individuals; it is an
expression of political will. Deep poverty can be willed away by divesting government monies from
policies that criminalize the poor and investing monies in basic subsistence."). If in fact, the state is
compelled, through this restructured notion of autonomy, to provide the support we collectively need to
realize a more robust vision of self-determination, this could give rise to a quite radical restructuring of
social and economic institutions. One need only recall the discussion above of today's vast income
disparities and the atrociously inadequate material failure of the current safety net to meet the needs of
those in poverty to see that a supportive state on these terms would require significant economic and
political change. June Carbone has recently suggested that Eichner's work leads almost inevitably to
these consequences. In a recent review of Eichner's book, Carbone suggested that, while Eichner herself
does not conclude that her vision would require a significant restructuring of structural economic
inequality, fully realizing the theory would require such a restructuring. June Carbone, Book Review,
The Supportive State: Families, Government, and America's Political Ideals, II PERSP. ON POL. 241,
242 (2013) ("If we assume, for example, as a growing body of evidence indicates, that greater inequality
itself harms family stability, would liberal theory compel adoption of more egalitarian policies even at
the expense of greater economic 'inefficiency'? Does the state have an obligation to address class-based
differences in fertility in order to compel greater equality? Must it champion stronger families even if
higher taxes or greater regulation limit the autonomy of the wealthy? If greater inequality is inevitably a
threat to the family, does that make it intrinsically incompatible with justice for that reason alone?").
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support lies, as Roberts argues, in a much more robust conception of privacy.
As Roberts frames it, "merely ensuring the individual's 'right to be let alone' -
may be inadequate to protect the dignity and autonomy of the poor and
oppressed." 250 Indeed a better notion of privacy "includes not only the negative
proscription against government coercion, but also the affirmative duty of
government to protection the individual's personhood from degradation and to
facilitate the processes of choice and self-determination." 25 1
But the importance of regulatory intersectionality suggests that in addition
to privacy from intrusion and an affirmative duty of support, one also needs
safety from punishment. To understand how this might function it is helpful to
briefly examine the phenomena of privacy intrusions and escalating
punishment in turn.
As to privacy, Khiara Bridges argues that social support programs like
PCAP are so fundamentally imbued with structures that assume no privacy that,
in our current socio-political and legal environment, it is more accurate to say
that poor families have no privacy rights to begin with.252 This is certainly bom
out in her careful analysis as well as in the examples above. Although the focus
of this article has been on the mechanisms of escalating punishment rather than
on the privacy deprivations inherent in these programs, there is no question that
these examples also confirm Bridges' characterization of social support.
The focus on the regulatory mechanisms that lead to ever-escalating
punishment suggests a separate and additional price. Poor women seeking
support not only suffer extraordinary deprivations of privacy, but those
deprivations of privacy lead to the gathering (and negative characterization) of
information, which then in turn leads to additional punishment. Kaaryn
Gustafson's extensive work on the criminalization of welfare 253 lays bare many
of the mechanisms that are in place to exact this punitive toll. The mechanisms
of enhanced punishment and disproportionate impact of regulatory
intersectionality described above provide further information about precisely
how the state administers itself to facilitate enhanced punishment.
To return to the examples in Section III, the cost a poor woman pays for
support is not only the devastating cost of losing control of her home, her body,
and her personal information. She also submits, as a price of support, to serious
250. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 80, at 1478.
251. Id. at 1479.
252. Bridges, supra note 56, at 173. Bridges argues from her example that class controls who has
rights and that the poor simply fall on the wrong side of the dividing line. Id. One could easily point to
the mechanisms and outcomes in this article and come to the same conclusion. In her discussion,
Bridges tums to the viability of the rights frameworks suggested by Roberts, Eichner, and Fineman,
among others, which Bridges characterizes as "rights to " as opposed to "rights against." Id. at 174. In
discussing the viability of these rights, she raises the disturbing possibility that "[t]here is a danger that
the poor would, in spite of a revolutionary reformulation of rights, find themselves in the same
predicament in which they now find themselves: possessing 'rights' without substance, meaning or
effect." Id. This prospect is similarly raised by the mechanisms described in this article.
253. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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risk of punishment. To put it differently, while it should be true, as the Supreme
Court noted in Ferguson, that "[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed
by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results
of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her
consent," 2 54 for poor, disproportionately African-American women, this is an
assumption that does not comport with reality. Given how mechanisms of
regulatory intersectionality actually function, it is far more reasonable for a
poor, African-American woman to assume both that she has no privacy and that
the cost of seeking prenatal or childbirth care may well be the investigation of
her family, the loss of her children, and her possible prosecution and
incarceration. And this is true for her even though her higher-income white
counterpart, who is just as likely to have used drugs during her pregnancy,255 is
far less likely to face these escalating penalties. An applicant for welfare faces
similar risks and may pay a similar price.
To rewrite this formula, then, is to abandon the structural mechanisms not
only of deprivations of privacy, but those mechanisms that facilitate escalating
punishment. To the extent that the phenomena of regulatory intersectionality
facilitates hyperregulation - the targeting by race, class, gender and place of
particular people so as to exert social control on those people - we must
dismantle it and build something better in its place. Below are some practical
suggestions about how we might think about getting there.
C. Some Steps on the Path Forward
As briefly detailed in Part II, in the 1930s the United States made a
decision to bifurcate its programs of social support. One system was put in
place for those who are not poor and another was put in place for those who are
,,256poor and "deserving. As a matter of law and systems, this allows us to
administer these two categories of assistance in profoundly different ways. So
even though it seems evident that a middle-class family receiving Social
Security retirement benefits or Medicare would never tolerate the price of
support imposed for poor families, this poses no administrative problem. The
two systems are simply run tremendously differently.
To the extent this is true, one answer to the question of how to move
forward lies both in shifting to more universal benefit systems, or short of that,
to benefits that are quasi-universal as described below. If the move to more
universal or quasi-universal benefit systems is not politically feasible, moving
forward can also involve restructuring poverty-targeted programs in four ways:
erecting more privacy protections and higher bars on surveillance and
254. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
255. See supra notes 181-188.
256. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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monitoring in the first place, enforcing and creating new privacy protections
within systems once information is collected, building higher walls between
support systems and punishment systems, and finally exercising significant
caution in the face of calls for coordination and collaboration.
1. Towards Universal Benefits and Universally Employed Structures (But
Carefully) 257
258
As noted in Part II of this article, the institutions of the social welfare
state in the United States have, since at least the New Deal, been bifurcated,
with one set of programs - Social Security, Medicare and the like - going to one
group of people and another set - Welfare, Medicaid, Food Stamps (now the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP) and the like - going to
the poor. Although it has not been a focus of this article, other scholars have
documented the ways in which these poverty-focused programs have been
characterized by behavioral controls and racialized tropes. They have also
extensively documented the ways in which, as legal barriers to receipt fell in
the late 1960s and early 1970s and the rolls grew to include significant numbers
of African-American families, an extraordinary backlash took place. This
backlash wielded racial tropes (the most powerful among them was the welfare
queen) to radically restructure and gut virtually all of what remained of what
was Aid to Families With Dependent Children. Even today, as the "new"
welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, is almost entirely
in shambles, provides less and less, and serves fewer and fewer of those in
need,259 it remains the continued target of significant punitive legislative and
popular attack. One need only look at the trend toward welfare drug testing in
the face of both data demonstrating the fiscal and policy failures and the
consistent judicial disapproval of these programs to understand the continued
257. Eichner's vision of the Supportive State impacts a wide range of policy areas. Very roughly
speaking realizing a supportive state would entail revisions of both how the market operates and the
creation of programs and institutions to address vulnerability and dependency needs. In the first
category, the supportive state would include policies regulating the market: "upper limit[s] on
mandatory working hours, ... paid time off for caretaking, [prohibitions on the firing of) parents of
young children ... for refusing to work overtime, and ... flexible hours [requirements]." EICHNER, supra
note 2, at 65. On the programmatic and institutional side the supportive state would include the
provision of, for example, universal health care, subsidized high quality childcare and pre school
education and high quality public schools. The analysis in this paper focuses exclusively on the
programmatic and institutional support mechanisms of the supportive state.
258. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
259. Nationally, the effectiveness of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF") in serving
and meeting the financial assistance needs of those in poverty has fallen precipitously. For example, in
1996, TANF provided some measure of assistance to 72% if families in poverty. in 2011, that number
had plummeted to the point where TANF served only 27% of families in poverty. TANF also pays
significantly less to those families. In 1996, TANF provided families with 35% of the funds necessary to
raise that family to the federal poverty measure whereas by 2011, that number had fallen to 28%. A
TANF Misery Index, LEGAL MOMENTUM 1 (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.legalmomentum.org/our-
work/women-and-poverty/a-tanf-misery-index.pdf.
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political value of supporting anti-welfare legislation to building political
capital.260 Although welfare arguably continues to be the object of the most
political scorn, nearly every program that provides obvious and direct support
exclusively to those in poverty is easily and continuously attacked on the same
basis and with the same hateful tools.
It is certainly true, given this atrocious history and continued political
attacks, that programs that seem and/or are more universal have considerably
more promise for garnering political support. Ideally it would be far better for
the supportive state overall if we had universal benefits: for example, universal
health care and universal caregiver subsidies. There is no shortage of models
for such programs and, as many have noted, European countries provide many
good examples of what universal support might look like. Having said that,
however, proposing universal benefits in the American context faces perhaps
insurmountable political barriers. Given recent history, more politically
promising examples come in the form of benefits that, while targeted toward
those in poverty, are structured through mechanisms and systems that serve
those who are also not low income. Benefits like these have recently and
productively been described by Suzanne Mettler as part of a "submerged state,"
the benefits of which provide significant financial support and, crucially, are
not readily visible either to those who receive them or as a supportive program
of the state.261 Recent prominent examples of success in this area come in the
form of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The EITC is submerged within
a regulatory institution and regulatory framework that administers programs
that serve those not in poverty.
The EITC is administered by the Internal Revenue Service, and, as is the
case for other tax benefits, is granted largely based on self-reporting.262 The
EITC has been lauded as one of the most effective anti-poverty policies in
recent years.263 Although it has not been without its detractors, there is no
question that the EITC is tremendously effective in transferring income into the
260. On the trend to implement welfare drug-testing, see supra notes 199-206 and accompanying
text. On the issues of the constitutionality of these statutes, see supra note 199.
261. SUZANNE METILER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: How INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLITICS
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (2011). Mettler argues that the invisible nature of many of the
benefits received by the non-poor in America, principle examples of which are tax code benefits such as
the home mortgage deduction, are not visible in political discourse. Mettler makes the argument, quite
persuasively that this invisibility, when contrasted with the highly visible nature of poverty programs,
enables the sustaining, in the American political conversation, of an image that the non-poor do not
depend on the government. Mettler argues that it is essential for the health of American democracy to
make those programs visible, to in effect emerge the submerged state. While I absolutely agree with this
point, I am using Mettler here slightly differently - to suggest that submerged benefits, precisely
because of their comparative invisibility, have and likely will continue to gamer more political support
that visible programs.
262. Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 AM. U. L.
REV. 1261, 1264 (2007).
263. See, e.g., Chuck Marr, Jimmy Charite & Chye-Ching Huang, Earned Income, CTR. ON
BUDGET 1 (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.cppb.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf.
374 [Vol. 25:2
The Hyperregulatory State
hands of low-income working families and lifting them out of poverty. In 2011,
for example, the combined effect of the EITC and the Child Care Tax Credit
"lifted 9.4 million people, including 4.9 million children above the Census
Bureau new research Supplemental Poverty Measure." 264 For the purposes of
this analysis, what is interesting is the administrative structure surrounding the
EITC. Like any other personal tax benefit, eligibility for the credit is
established through self-reporting on a taxpayer's income tax forms. This
system of administration is a far cry from programs like TANF or the PCAP
program described by Khiara Bridges, both of which involve significant
intrusions and data collection well beyond what is required to establish
financial eligibility for the programs.
Although benefits that are embedded within regulatory agencies, and
programs that serve a more universal population are less visible and therefore
less subject to the overt political attacks suffered by programs associated with
"welfare," even in these more universal regulatory settings, there are plenty of
reasons to worry about the continued targeting of those in poverty. A couple of
examples suggest this conclusion. First, one might recall that the laws
regulating health care, the privacy of medical information, and the use of child
welfare and criminal justice administration that were highlighted in Part III's
discussion of pregnant women seeking health care do not in fact differ
explicitly by race or income status. We have no law, nor could we given the
state of our constitutional jurisprudence, that calls for the clear disparities in
administration of these laws when it comes to poor black women and their
children. And yet the evidence of disproportionate punitive impact is quite
clear.265 Similarly, although the EITC is embedded within the tax code, it is
clear that the IRS focuses a disproportionate portion of its auditing resources on
low-income taxpayers.266 These disparities suggest that, even in programs
regulated by arms of the regulatory state that impact larger proportions of the
population, one must remain vigilant that the poor in general, and poor
communities of color in particular, are not subject to more scrutiny and
regulation within those agencies.
264. Id. at 9. The Supplemental Poverty Measure was promulgated in 2010 to provide a more
accurate measure of poverty. Like the official poverty measure it sets a an annual income threshold
below which a family is defined as poor. But it is seen as more accurate primarily because of its
inclusion of the effect of tax credits and governments benefits, its inclusion of work related and medical
expenses, its recalculation of the poverty income threshold and its inclusion of geographic variation in




265. See supra Subsection Ill(A)(6).
266. See Leslie Book, The IRS's EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in the Net, 81 OR.
L. REV. 351, 374 (2002); Ventry, supra note 261, at 1273-74.
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2. Restructuring Poverty Programs and Building New Ones
Though calls for universal benefits and/or significantly increased low-
income benefits administered by agencies like the IRS might well address some
of the concerns raised in this article, the heart of the critique falls on what
remains of programs designed explicitly to serve those in poverty. It also falls
by implication on initiatives, essential to a robust supportive or responsive
state, to provide significantly more support to poor families. Addressing the
twofold harm described above (privacy deprivation and punishment) involves
four steps: erecting more privacy protections and higher bars on surveillance
and monitoring in the first place; enforcing and creating new privacy
protections within systems once information is collected; building higher walls
between support systems and punishment systems; and finally, exercising
significant caution in the face of calls for coordination and collaboration.
i. Protecting Informational Privacy and Respecting Family
Autonomy
In the support programs discussed in this article, women are forced, as a
condition of either applying for the benefit (in the case of welfare) or seeking
the service (in the case of health care) to part with vital information that, in
other settings and for other people, would be considered private. Although the
demand for and collection of this information is clearly a harm in and of itself,
what is important here is that the information (and negative interpretation of the
information) leads to the punishment. The decision, embedded within formal
and informal legal and regulatory structures described above, to seek a drug test
leads to additional intervention, questioning, and information acquisition.
Doctors, nurses, and social workers intervene and question, collecting
information that ultimately results in punitive actions against the family by the
267child protection and criminal justice agencies. One need only recall the
sources for facts underlying the child abuse prosecutions and the findings of
Flavin and Paltrow to recall that health care providers, social workers, and child
protection staff provide much of the information to justify punishing these
families.
What if, instead, programs were restructured to protect the informational
privacy of the women involved? What if it were the woman herself who chose
whether she would submit to drug tests and additional interviews? What if the
contents of her medical records were in fact confidential and there were a very
high and enforceable bar against disclosure? What if we significantly shifted
267. Bridges's work on the PCAP program provides another compelling example of the ways in
which extensive information gathering is imbedded within the legal framework and regulatory systems
of poverty programs. See Bridges, supra note 56.
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program eligibility rules and administrative structures to require the gathering
of only minimal information and respected the rights of families to keep their
homes, their bodies, and, in the vast majority of circumstances, the choices they
make about how to parent, private?
These proposals almost inevitably lead to calls of caution concerning the
welfare of children, and it is certainly true that we continue to need
mechanisms to intervene in cases of abuse and neglect. But before concluding
that we cannot take the legal and regulatory finger towards intervention off the
scale and rebalance it to lean much more strongly toward informational
privacy, it is important to remember that, for families who are not poor, this is
already the case. For communities that are not in poverty we apparently assume
as a society that having laws against child abuse and neglect and the ability to
prosecute child abuse is enough to protect children. It is only in those programs
that actually (welfare) or as a matter of practice (health care in poor
communities) serve and target poor, disproportionately African-American
communities that we have put our legal and regulatory mechanism on the scale
toward monitoring, information gathering, information-sharing and escalating
punishment. To rebalance the state toward autonomy is to address this class and
race disparity.
ii. Enforcing Existing Privacy Protections and Choosing to
Incorporate New Ones
To begin to move toward this rebalancing, it is important to note that much
of the information transmission described in this article happened in
contravention of the law. For example, as noted in Part III, despite significant
variations in state law, some of which would have clearly banned some or all
reporting, in one of the studies discussed above, health care providers told
researchers that they reported virtually every substance exposed newborn. In
other cases, there are clear policy choices involved. Although some of the
welfare drug testing legislation calls for reporting to child protective agencies,
268some of them are in fact far more protective. While the data on drug testing
in the health care setting suggests that these privacy protections are likely to
provide little actual protection, it is worth noting that some privacy protections
exist. To the extent this is the case, research, systemic advocacy, and individual
representation efforts designed to expose and punish violation of these
protections would represent a small positive step. In addition, as proposals to
impose drug testing on recipients of public benefits programs on the state and
federal level continue to be presented, for those jurisdictions where they cannot
be entirely defeated, it is worth devoting advocacy resources to pushing for
268. For an example of slightly more protective statutes in Georgia and Tennessee, see supra notes
226 and 231 and accompanying text.
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strong privacy protections. Finally for those who provide legal services to the
poor, it is also worth paying careful attention to privacy protections within the
systems that impact their client's lives. To the extent that we can enforce
existing protections and create new ones, this might represent small progress in
addressing the harms described in this article.
iii. Building High Walls Between Support and Punishment
In the examples of regulatory intersectionality above, information travels
with extraordinary ease from the support setting to more punitive settings. To
address this, much higher walls are in order. If we are to restructure poverty-
focused support programs to support the autonomy of poor families, we need to
erect much higher walls between programs that are designed to support families
and programs that are explicitly punitive. If the child welfare system is
reimagined, as the supportive or responsive state would call for, to focus far
more resources on support of families over intervention, removal and foster
care, this would need to include a very strong separation between those parts of
the state that support and the parts of the state that can impose punishment.
Similarly, the extraordinary administrative presence of policing and
prosecution in support programs needs to be eliminated. In the vast majority of
circumstances those who purport to offer support: people like teachers, social
workers, doctors, nurses, and non-profit staff simply should not regularly be
sharing information with police and prosecutors. It should be the extraordinary
rather than the expected case that these actors end up as witnesses for the
prosecution. Lest we conclude that this is impossible, it is important to recall,
as this article suggested at the start, that systems of support that look like this
already exist. For those who are not poor, this is precisely how support
functions in their communities.
iv. Exercising Significant Caution in Settings Involving Collaboration
and Coordination
The analysis has important implications for the persistent calls for and use
of collaboration and coordination among social service programs. Seemingly
everywhere one looks in the social service, child welfare, and juvenile justice
worlds, there are extensive calls for coordination and co-location of services.
These programs generally include extensive provisions for and mechanisms to
facilitate data-sharing among agencies. While there is no doubt that, in certain
circumstances, these efforts to coordinate and co-locate yield benefits for
clients of those systems, the data in this article suggests that we should exercise
significant caution. In thinking about whether to engage in collaboration, we
might ask, from the perspective of regulatory intersectionality, what punitive
outcomes might result from the collaboration. Does the collaboration require
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data-sharing with agencies that have the statutory power to remove children
and/or to use information to support prosecutions of children and families? Will
the clients be primarily poor families of color? If so, what safeguards exist to
ensure that these punitive outcomes will not disproportionately impact families
of color? What safeguards and protections exist for families to protect their
privacy and to ensure that the information they share does not end up
facilitating their punishment? Do clients have rights, embedded within the
program, to choose only some services and to set the terms of service in a way
that enhances rather than compromises their autonomy? These and other
questions are essential if we are to engage in these projects in a way that guards
against the disturbing outcomes described in this paper.
CONCLUSION
Moving from today's hyperregulatory state to an autonomy-enhancing
supportive state is an enormous and daunting task to which scholars and
activists must devote their considerable energies and talents. By re-centering
the question of how to realize this goal on the lived institutional structures of
today's domestic social welfare state, this paper has attempted to give a sense
of the challenges ahead, to suggest some necessary steps in this path, and to
suggest areas for future research and activism. In conclusion, I would like to
return, for a moment, to where this paper began. Imagine again that you are a
person in need of support. You have plans, dreams and hopes for yourself, for
your family, and for your children, but it is difficult to realize all of this on your
own. You need help. Depending on who you are, where you are, and what your
life has brought so far, the support you need might vary significantly from the
support that others need to realize their own dreams and goals. If the state
provided that support, what form would it take? What risks should you have to
take, in terms of the safety of yourself and your family, in order to get that
support? How best might the state assist you in realizing your goals? If we can
each answer those questions for ourselves, perhaps at least the task of
envisioning a supportive state is not so difficult after all.
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